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PREFACE
The choice of the moral philosophy of Paul ^illich
as the subject of a doctorates dissertation calls
for some explanation.
For many years now Paul ^illich has held the
reputation of "being a philosopher-theologian in Germany
and America. It was not until the publication of
J.A.Robinson's book HONEST TO GOD , in march 1965 that his
name came Before intellectual circles in England and very
shortly afterwards through the translation of Robinsons
book^into different Europian languages, in other countries
as vxell, "^his book , a paperback, claims to be a
critiqjie of traditional views in philosophy and theology
on the nature of God and also traditional conceptions
of the nature of moralitye Pavil tillich is cited
on every second page as the source of these views which
Robinson is attempting to popularise and ^ence cannot but
appear as Robinsons theological and philosophical guide.
Weak philosophically and theologically,Robinsons book , was
bound to draw criticism not only on himself but also on
Tillich whom he so glibly quotes ^throughout the book.
Mediated through such a work,^ Tillich appears to the Linguistic
Analysists as a throwback to the verbal confusion of late
19th century German Philosophy ; his views on morality make
him appear as playing into the hands of many continental
philosophers who affirm that a thing is right because we
make it right and wrong as we make it wrong ; to many
Thomists it was Robinsons chapter on morality that called
forth the sharpest criticism on Tillich as providing a basis
for a contemporary moral philosophy,
'^here is so much glip and uncritical quotation of Tillich
IV.
in this book that one cannot but be left with this impression.
Those who are not familiar with Tillich's own writings, —
and not just his ethical works but the whole framework of
his thought are bound to get this impression. I'illich's
ethical philosophy must be seen in the light of his
metaphysical and anthropological ideas if they are to
be justly and critically evaluated, "^his is the main
purpose of this dissertation, namely to examine Tillichs
ethical philosophy on its o-vm merits, in its own context,
and trying to prescind at the same time from any
presuppositions ones own particular formation in Thomistic
moral philosophy that may restrict ones vision®
In the course of this study other considerations
encouraged me to persevere in this task. J'ar from finding
that I'illich's moral philosophy superficial, I found
that he wa? continaally engaged in a dialogue, not only
with contemporary philosophers such as Heidegger and
Husserl but also with the key moral ideas of
classical philosophers of the last and previous centuries
such as Eant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Schelling and others. In
other words he is engaged in a dialogue with a
philosophy which Thomists have regarded as inadequate for
providing a solid basis to an ethical philosophy, and
which they themselves have consistently ignored, '^he
success or failure of such a project cannot but be of
interest even to Thomists,
Consequently one finds in '-f^illich's moral philosophy
a serious effort to integrate the present day enphasis
on the historicity of and the dynamic element in man
V.
with metaphysical and anthropological doctrines stemming
from the classical philosophical tradition. If it is
true that^here is a crisis in Thomist moral philosophy
today ahout its ability to incorporate such findings
about the historicity of man and his dynamic nature^^as
revealed and discussed by existential phenomonologists^
and psychologists attached to the same movement — such
a crisis would seem to centre around the notion of natural
law it is interesting to see how "^illich , rooted
in'^different philosophical tradition and sources comes
to terms with these same discoveries.
Finally one other thing we found stimulating in
the study of Tiliich's ethical philosophy was the fact that
he is trying to stand on the borderline between the
Catholic and Protestant approach to ethics. Ifhough the
Protestant religion is an external factor in the formation
of Tillich's ethical philosophy, turning his mind
in certain directions for the solutions of various problems ,
his chief moral doctrines are sustained by metaphysical
and anthropological considerations, which bring^ him closer
to the Catholic approach to ethics wherein it is conceived
as an autonomous science. A case in point is his
opposition to law which cannot be equated with the
traditional negative lutherian opposition to this concept, but
is a consequence of his basic philosophical principles.
It is as well to forewarn the reader about Tillichs
terminoSiogy. ^I^feiatever about the conciseness or clearness
of his German writings, it was inevitable that a man who
VI.
first tegan to write in English at the age of 47, was
going to be handicapped as regards accurate and concise
terminology, liven to -English readers this terminology
has appeared somewhat strange and unusual. His German
"background and the fact that the english at his disposal
was of the American variety acctaimt in Bome part for
the seeming vagueness of his terminology. Hence an effort
is required at times to penetrate this terminology he uses
in order to understand what Illlich is trying to convey.
CHAPTER I.
BIOG-RAPHIGAL IITTRODUCTI OH
LIFE. imUENCES, WORKS.
Because of the number and the diversity of factors
that exercised an influence on the formation and the
development of the mind of Paul Tillich, it is necessary
to commence this study of his moral philosophy, with
an introductary survey of pertinent biographical material.
The genesis, nature, and development of his ideas -
philosophical and theological - are intimately linked, to
hereditary, geographical, emotional, artistic, intellectual
and religious influences, he enduredijnot only in his early
years of formation^ but throughout the whole coiirse of his
long academic career^ He himself has provided us with
a key to the developing structure of his thought, as it was
shaped by the different influences brought to bear on him,
in three autobiographical essays, written at three
different periods of his life
The first essay forms the opening chapter of
THE INTERPrSioN OP HISTORY,published in 1956, three years
after his arrival in the United States, as an emigrant
from Nazi Germany^ The longest of the three essays^it
gives one an insight, not only into the actual genesis
of Tillich's ideas in concrete situations of his
early life but also ^ Tillichs interpretion and
evaluation of these early influences. A second
autobiographical essay appeared in 1948, as an introduction
2»
to another collection of essays., THE PROTESTANT ERA«
It is particularly useful for appreciating the development
of his ideas between the two World Wars. A third essay -
'Autobiographical Reflexions ' - serves as an introduction
to a collection of essays of interpretion and criticism
on Tillich's work itself, entitled THE THEOLOG-Y OP PAUL TILLICH
and published in 1952. This third essay recapitulates some
of the earlier material, adding to it, what he considers
the effects, his departure from his native Germany, have had
on his thought, and also what new influsnces he has
undergone in the United States®
Thotigh there is considerable overlapping in these
three essays, each one of them could be said to correspond
to the three great periods of his life (l)® The first period
comprises his early years of formation, his secondary school
and "university education and his period of service in the
G-erman army during the I9I4-I8 ¥ar» The second period
covers the fifteen years of lecturing in various German
universities beginning in I9I8, and extending up to 1933,
the year in which he was forced to leave Germany. In the
Third period - that which one could call 'The American Years',
he sets about a complete reconstruction or systematization
of his thought® In this introductary chapter we will
concentrate on the abundant biographical material provided
in these three essays, aS other writers on Paul Tillich's
work have done.> "e will follow the threefold division of his
life and work^outlined above®
(1),, "e accept the division of Tillichs thought and work
into three phases or periods as outlined by G.H.TAVARD
in his work ; Paul Tillich and the Christian Message p 3.
This division corresponds to'^natural development^' in his
intellectual development, as'^well as to decisive events
in his life.
(2) KEGLEY AED BRETALL ; The Theology of Paul Tillich p 16.
In letting Tillidi speak for himself, in these essays, one
becomes aware of his subjective intention, at different
periods of his life® It is tn^e that the subjective intention
of the writer may not correspond with the objective
of the work proposed, or that his evaluation of a particular
influence on his thoiight or shift of emphasis may not
correspond with our evaluation of the imporiince of the
same factor of influence or change of direction in his
work as a whole Nevertheless, an examination of the
autobiographical material Tillich provides us with, offers
us a unique insight into the 'genesis of his thought' and
'the intentionality of the product' (l), both of which are
invaluable for a proper understanding of his philosophy
particular^his moral philosophy—and a subsequent impartial
critical evaluation of the latter.
ARTICTi"F! I. Early Years ; The Period of Preparation
Tillich regards the concept of the'Borderline' as the most
fitting symbol by which to describe the whole of his
personal and intellectual development
"It has been my fate, in almost every direction,
to stand between alternative possibilities of
existence, to be completly at home in neither,
to take no definite stand against either " (2)
To begin with the fact that he was bom on the 20th. Atigust
1886, places him on the boundary between the I9th. and 20th.
centuries,especially if one regards the I9th. century as
ending on •'Sigust Ist® I9I4, the day the 1st world war started,
aS Tillich himself does (3)® Partaking in., or gt least in
(I) Expressions used by TA7ARD ; Paul Tillich and the
Christian message, p I,
(2) !|i!he Interpretation of History p 3
O) Ibid. p8.
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touch with, all the revolutionary movements of the late
IfSjh. and early 20th. centuries, he nevertheless admits
a nostalgic longing for the relative stability of the I9th
centTiry. This manifested itself in particular, he says,
in the sphere of thought, in a hankering for the security
of the great German Idealist systems, eventhough he
recognised, that they were now outmoded. (I).
Tillich was horn in the village: of Starzedel, a small
industrial town in the province of Brandenburg® ^^our years
lifter the family moved to Schonfliess, ETeumark, where his
father , a minister of the Prussian territorial ^hurch
was appointed superintentent of the diocesan schools. In
regard to his parents he has seen himself as sharing in
two temperaments, that of the Rhineland, inherited from
his mother, and that of Prussia inherited from his father.
Prom the former he says he derived a 'zeal for living,
sensuous concreteness,mobility, rationality, and democracy',
from the latter ' a meditative bent , tinged with
melancholy, a heightened consciousness of duty and personal
sin, a s^ong sense for authority and feudal tradition' (2).
His life is a battleground between these two opposing sets
of qualities, in which the preponderance of h-^ fathers
influence prevailed for many years and entailing a severe
reaction in later life against heteronomy in all its forms.
(1). HEYWOOD THOMAS in his book Paul Tillich an Appraisal
thinks that the great German Idealist systems made such
an impression on the mind of '^illich that he could
be called "a igtho, century thinker in 20th. century dress"
p. 176. He underestimates the element of originality
in Tillieh's philosophy^ AC .(2) This word 'heteronomy with its co\mterpart 'autonomy'
and that which is a synthesis of the two—'Theonomy', form
a tril<^ogy of concepts that pervade Tillichs whole work
Applied in many different areas Heteronomy usually
signifies an oppressive forige, coming from outside, and
foreign to the organism or person itself.
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All the great memories of his childhood, he associates
with this little town of Schonfliess and its surrounding
countryside, where he lived from his fourth to his
fouKtbeHth year - the soil , the winds, and the forests.
His reg\ilar visits to Berlin developed in him a counter
attraction to the life of the big city.
"It saved me from romantic enmity against technical
civilization and taught me to appreciate the
importance of the "big city for the critical side
of artistic and intellectual life" (I).
His experience of country life, he suggests, may partly
acco-unt for the ^omantic trend in his feeling and thinking
and which explains 'the tremendous emotional impact' (2)
Schellings philosophy of nature made upon him. The influence
of German poetic literature and his Lutheran background
he: also acknowledges as causal factors in this matter®
From the age of four to fourteen Tillich attended a
Common School in his home town, Por the next two years he
travelled to the nearby city of Konigsberg to attend the
Grymnasium there» Continuing his classical education in
Berlin in 1900, where his father was appointed to a new post,
he graduated from the gymnasium there in 1904. The conflict
betweena the classical education he received at these
schools and his home environment was the cause of another
boundary situation, Tlae effects of a life in a parish house
attached to a .'beautiful gothic church', where his father
Wf^s a successful pastor, provided him with an experience
of the 'Holy' which he ca,aims was the foundation of all
his religious and theological work (3). From this experience.
(1) Interpretation of History p 6
(2) "Schellings philosophy of nature which I read in a state
of intoxication, as it were surrounded by the beauties
of nature, became for me the direct expression of the
experience of nature". Interpretation of History p 7
(3) KEGLBY Airo BRETALL . The Theology of Palhili -^illich p 4
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- mystical sacramental and aesthetic - of the presence of
the Divine, he derived the ethical and logical elements
of religion and not vica-versa» The significance of this
will 'become apparent when we come to examine the place of
God in his ethical philosophy. Counteracting this
experience of the Divine, even at this early age , was
the severely classical education he received at the schools
he attended. The ensuing iSonflict is the starting point of ,
his vocation of standing on the borderline between religion
and culture , philosophy and theology® It culminated in
the three volumes of his SYSTEMATIC THEOLOG-Y, published
forty years later, which contains his final and definitive
solution to this problem^
Matriculating in the theological faculties of Berlin,
Tubingen and Halle, he took his first theological exam
in 1909 and his second in I9II. Prom his last years at the
gymnasium he had been attracted towards philosophy (l),
and while there he had used available moment to read
any philosophical works he could get his hands on. Before
coming to the university he had read SCHWEGLER*S History
of Philosophy. PICHTt'S Theory of Science and KAITT'S
Critique of Pure Reason . Philosophical discusseions with
his father at home and with students of similiar interests
at the university had whetted his philosophical appetite.
It Was the writings of FRITZ I^IDICUS - a professor at the
university of Halle—that had stimulated his interest
in Pichti's philosophy. However it was the philosophy of
SCHELLING that really captivated his mind at this time. It
shaped his thought more profoundly than any other thinker
(I) Interpretation of History p 30.
"Pg.rtly "by chance of a "bargain purchase and
partly by inner affinity, I came under the influence
of SCHELLING, whose collected works I read through
several times, with enthusiasm" (l).
It is not surprising then that the subject of his
thesis, presented: at Breslau University in I9I0 for the
degree of doctorate in Philosophy was entitled ; THE RELIGIOUS-
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSTRUCTION OP SCHELLING'S POSITIVE
PHILOSOPHY i ITS PRESUPPOSITIONS AND PRINCIPLES and that
the title of his licentiate thesis in theology, presented
a year later at Halle univeristy WaS MTSTICISM AND THE
SENSE OE GUILT IN SCHELLING'S PHILOSOPHICAL DEVBLOP]yiENT.
Though he was to experience philosophical influences from
other sources, some yea^s later one can see that it was
on German Idealism and Neo-Kantian thought his mind fed
diiring his early years of formation.
It is important %oo to mention the theological influences
he came in contact with at this time, , as they also
made a definite impression on his philosophical thought
and method® MARTIN KAHLER, a professor of theology
at Halle university, seems to have made the greatest
impression on Tillich in this sphere« To KAHhh'R he
attributes his insight into the all controlling
character of the Pauline and LutherAne idea of justification
"It rends every human claim in the face of God
and shows how the decadence of human existence
guilt and despair, is overcome by the paradoxicaljudgement that the sinner is just before God (2).
This principle of justification which he says constitutes
the universal validity of Protestantism, has an all
pervading influence on '-^illich's thought even his strictly
philosophical ideas® He acknowledges that it is the
The Interpretation of History p 30.
Ibid p 32e
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Protestant principle that prepared his mind for the
acceptance of Kierkegaard's and Heiiiegger's analysis
of hiJisian existence some years later, " '^or the moment,
however it is SCHSLLING who dominates his thought. He
finds in him, especially in the later Schelling, the
Way to reconcile his Protestant religion and his Idealist
orientated philosophy.
" I thought that fujA-ndamentally I had found the
union of theology and philosophy in the
philosophical explanation of the Qhristian
doctrines through the older Schelling, in his
founding of a Christian philosophy of existence
in contrast to Hegel's humanistic
philosophy of essence, and in his interprefetion
of history and the history of salvation" (l).
Under the combined influence of Schelling and Kahler he
became familiar with the'method of dialectics ' which will
dominate all his later work in Philosophy and !j?heology. H©
descrities dialectics as the way of seeking for truth by
talking with others from various points of view, that is
through'yes' and 'no' until a 'yes' has been reached which
is hardened in the fire of many 'nos'and. which unites
the element of truth promoted in the discussion (2)®. ^Chis
leaves room for mediation,according to ^illich, not only
between one philosophical doctrine and another but also
between philosophy and theology^ Calvinism and Pioritanism
oppose such mediation because they oppose the participation
of nature in the process of the Pall and Salvation, Ritsch
allows for no mediation either as an infinite gap is
established between nature and personality® With Tillich
however, the combination of his early romantic attitude
(1)lnterprefeation of Histoyy p 35
(2) The Protestant Era, p xiii
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towards nature with 'the tremendous emotional impact'
of Schellings philosophy of nature upon him (l), demanded
some kind of mediation between philosophy and theology, or
to "be more precise for some kind of mystical participation
of man in natTire. According to Tillich the method of
'dialecties' makes this possible^ By it one can show
that 'nature is the finite expression of the infinite
ground of all things' (2)
In I912 Tillich received ordination in the Evangelical
Lutherian Chtirch of the province of Brandenburg, %en the
War broke out two years later, he joined the army as
g, chaplain , gnd served at the front for the four years
of the ware. The steady intellectual development.^
naturally^ came to a halt but during these four years his
mind received a drive in a completly new direction by
his 'discovery' of painting. He refers to this discovery
aS an 'experience of decisive importance' (3). Home on
leave from the front he had sought relief from the
'gruesomeness' and'destruc^iveness' of the war in
studying repro^ctions of paintings and in reading the
history of the arts®. Prom this study there came what he
calls the 'experience of art', the culminating climax
of which arrived at his seeing a picture by Botticelli, in
Berlin during his last furlough from the front.
"Upon experience followed reflexion and philosophical
and theological interpretation which lead me to
the fu^ndamental categories of my philosophy of
Religion and culture, namely form and content" (4)»
(1) EUGLEY AND BRETAIL ; The Theology of P, Tillich p 4
(2) Ibid p 4.
(3) Interpreation of History p 15
(4) Ibid p 16.
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His interest in painting then was not jp^lbgpJiejEj^.His
application of these two notions of form and content in the
sphere of moral philosophy will be of particular interest
to us.
His interest in painting also lead him to a more
sympathetic approach to the Roman Catholic Church - in fact
at one stage to contemplation of joining it. '^he over
whelming impression made upon him by early Italian
Christian art aroused his interest in older forms of
Catholicism in the early centuraffis of the Church aS well
aS in the middle ages® Here it seemed to him that the
'old church' had steered a migdle course between heteronomy
and autonomy towgrds theonomgymy. The catholdjcism of
today he thinks has lost its theononomous structure and he
considers it to be the most potent system of religious
heteronomy. Whenever one breaks through its
hardening crust however he adds that it can exercise
a peculiar fascination on the beholder® So^far from
Joining the catholic church he w^s driven to a deeper
interpretation of Protestantism. The continuing effect
of essentially Protestant theological attitudes on
Tillich's philosophy - eventhough it be only extrinsic —
cannot be considered neglibile by any means. (l)
(l) It should be i,dded here that jeven though Tillichs
interest in the catholic church grew along side his
interest in painting^the religious crisis in which he
considered seriously ^©ing joining the Catholic Churchy
did not occur until over fifteen years later and thatj
at a time when the only alternative to Catholicism for
Tillich appeared to be a National Socialist Protestant
church under the Hitler regieme.
II.
ARTICLE II. Post War Years :
The Period of Construction.
If, aS we said earlier, the war marked a pause
in Tillich's intellectual growth and development, it could
also "be said to constitute the dividing line between
Tillich , the Student and Tillich the Teacher, It is
the dividing point between the period of formation in which
he became imbued with the Idealist philosophy of the late
I9th. century and the period of construction in which he
starts to work out his own personal philosophical
positions, in the wake of the break-up. of the German
Idealist systems, and under the influence of new
philosophical currents pioneered chiefly by Hietiche and
Heidegger.
Tillich's first teaching assignment at the end of
the war was as a privatdozsnt in theology at the^ university
of Berlin, a post which he held for the next five years.
His experiences as an army chaplain at the front,,
contributed to the elimination of illusions he had
harboured before the war of an easy synthesis between the
Christian religion and German Idealist philosophy. Besides
destroying many other illusions, the world war , according
to Tillich also shattered Idealist philosophy, so much so
th^t he Was convinced that it could not be reconstructed
again# It was the experience of the 'abyss of our existence*
that made this impossible.
"If a reunion of theology and philosophy should
again become possible, it could be achieved only
in such a way as would do justice to thfes
experience of the abyss of our existence (l).
What does Tillich mean by 'the experience of the abyss of
our existence ? In the context of the passage just quoted
(I) Interpretation of History p 35
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it would appear to denote the experience of horrifying
scenes of carnage and human suffering at the war front.
Other passages would seem to link this experience of the
ajjyss with the Protestant principle and hence the gulf
that separates the sinner fromi the all'holy' God. More
probably both these significations point to a more
basis experience—that of our finitude but a finitude
in which the dimension^ of the \anconditonal or of the
infinite somehow explodes« His lectures during: these;
first years as a professor at Berlin were an effort to
explore this experience of the abyss or of the unconditonal
in widely divergent fields. And because this experience
of the abyss was basically a religious experience these
lectures took the form of the relation of religion to
Philosophy, Art, Politics,Psychoanalysis etc? in which
he was tring to work out a new synthesis between religion
and these different branches of knowledge^xn which the
dimension of the unconditonal would be properly accomodated.
He; describes this 'Philosophy of Religion' as
"An attempt to express in philosophical concepts
the experience of the abyss and the idea ofjustification as the limitation of philosophy" (l)
These lectures formed the material of his first published
work, THE. RELIGIOUS SITUATION (2), in which he analyses
the whole contemporary situation in art, science, education^
politics, philosophy, psychoanalysis etc. from the point
of view of the dimension of the unconditonal or in other
words the religious values they contain^. In all of them
the experience of the abyss^ is expressed in some particular
way.
(1) Interpretation of History p 35-36
(2) First published in 1926 \mder the title DIE RELIGIOSE
LAGE DER GEGEHV^ART. It waS translated with an
introduction by RICHARD NIEBUHR in 1932.
13.
According to Tillich there were three phi kinds of
philosophical tool at hand, at this time, for the
elaboration of this 'theononomous interpretation of culture'.
Each of then he finds defective« They were Ueo-Kantianism
the Philosophy of Values and Phenomonology. It was: ini
opposition to all three that his ovm philosophic^ attitude
developed® Bach of them implied some contradiction^ so
that he could not subscribe to any of them;
— "Not to KeO'^Eantianism, because in consequence of
its panlogical tendency it was not able to give
expression to the experience of the abyss and to
the paradox,..
— not to the philosophy of Values because it is still
Neo-Eantian and because its attempt to comprehend
Religion as a sphere of values, contradicts the
transcendence of value that is assumed in the abyss.
— mot to Phenomonology because in it the dynamic
element is lacking and because it furthers
Catholic conservative tendencies" (I)
What he felt most §.ttracted to at this time was Nietzsche's
Philosophy of Life* He found that the experience of the
abyss WaS expressed there,most clearly and because of its
historical dependence on the philosophy of Schelling it
was easy for him to approach it with sympathy® During these
yegrs then from I9I9 to 1925 it Was Nietzsche, more than
any other philosopher who influenced him and provided
him with the philosophical tools he needed to elaborate
a philosophy of religion.
Tillich acknowledges that his philosophical development
might have continued to move in the direction of Nietzsche's
Philosophy of life - assuming pagan elements into it
instead of Jewish and Catholic ones — if a non-philosophical
factor had not commenced to^nfluence him and dominate his
(I) Interpretation of history p 37
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thought, giving it a new direction® This new factor waS
-j
the experience of the social and political upheayjal or
what Tillich calls 'The German Revolution' that took place
after the war* The social aspect of philosophical and
theological problems was to come to the forefront of his
mind and to continue to dominate it right up to the end
of this second period®. Philosophical questions jthat
treated the individual as an individual^receded into the
background for the momenta
"My mind was now directed to a sociologically-
orientated and politically formed philosophy
of history... " (l)
"Together with my whole generation, I WaS grasped
by the overwhelming experience of a nation
wide community... of the end of a merely
individualistic and predominantly theoretical
existence (2)®,
Up to the end' of the war Tillichs attitmde to the
socialist movement, like that of most intellectuals in
Germany was one of indifference• It was only diuring the last
months of the war , when collapse was setting in all around
him, that the intep-reiation between capitalism and imperialism
the crisis of bourgeois society, the class struggle and
other social concerns became real for him,
"Thus when soon after the revolution the call
was sounded for the religious socialist
movement, I could not and would not resist it" (3).
Tillich now found himself in another bo-undary
situation, that between Lutherianism on the one hand
and Socialism on the other and though not believing
in the socialist hopes of Utopian dreams of a heaven in
this world he did envisage the possibility of a synthesis
between the transcendent message of God about the 'Kingdom
of God' fj^nd the immanent hopes of the revolutionary
movement^concerning social reconstruction.
ion of History p 37 (2) Kegley eind Bretall
Ibid p 20 THBOL.OP P.TILLICH P 10.
15.
Religious Socialism then would "be the drive towards the
Kingdom of God on earth. If the Kingdom of God could
never become, as Tillich fully realised,, a concrete
reality on earth, he did think that it could act as an
ideal which would map out and enlighten the way to
social reconstruction®
What is the significance of this change of
direction in Tillich's thought ? Socialism stressed
the importance of history and it was in history that Tillich
now discovered one of the foremost themes of all his
subsequent philosophical and one might add- theological
investigations# At the moment; it was the historical
dimension that became the focal point of all his interest®
The reason he states as follows.
"It was because of the historical reality as I
found it, when I returned from the 1st World War:
a chaotic Germany and Europe, the end of the
period of victorious bourgeoisie and of the I9th.
century way of life, the split between the
Lutherian Church at the Prolateriat, the gap
between the transcendent message of Christ and
the iaaae- immanent hopes of the revolutionary
movement" (l). Sew ^er-=fehe
Now for the first time the concept of Kairos begins to play
a predominant role in his thought® Intimately connected
with his philosophy of History this concept of Kairos
signifies 'the right moment', that point in time when
the unconditional breaks through the finite® The
ramifications of this concept in the ethical sphere, for
instance,in regard to the possibility of an unchanging
natural law,will be of special interest to us later on.
Tillich's interests in the philosophical, political,
(I) Interpreation of History p 22
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and economic aspects of religious socialism lejid to the
publication of his "book THE SOCIALIST DECISION (I) in
1933, and le^dia?^ also to his expulsion from Germany
in the same year.
¥e must retrace our steps , however, to the year
1925, when a change of residence, brought Tillich under
a new source of influence. In that year Tillich left Berlin
to become professor of Theology at Marburg where Maftin
Heidegger waS influencing some of the best students of
the university in his lectures there as professor of
Philosophy, Tillich leaves us in no doubt that he too
fell under the spell and that the appearence of
existentialist philosophy in Germany lead him to a new
understanding of the relation between philosophy and
Theology (2), In 1936 he stated three reasons why he was
so ready to accept this new way of thought
- "Firstly, because of an exact aquaintence with
Schelling's final period in which he attempted,
in opposition to Hegel's philosophy of being, to
pave a way for a philosophy of existence...
^ Secondly, by my-even if limited - knowledge of
Kierkegaard, the real founder of the philosophy
of existence
- and thirdly by my dependence on the Philosophy
of life.. " (3).
There is a fourth reason which he mentions elsewhere. The
existentialists present a doctrine of man and of human
freedom and its finiteness which is closely linked to
the Lutherian conception of the Fall of Man (4)
Sixteen years later Tillich's attitude to existentialism
(1) The German title is Die Sozialistische Bntscheidung.
(2) Interpretation of History p 39
(3) Ibid. p 39.(4) Tz/cotoij-y 1 '^^ ,
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had changed somewhat. In 1952 he remarked
"It took years before I became fully aware of the
impact of this encounter ( it is the encounter
with Heidegger's existentialism he hg^s in mind ),
on my own thinking. I resisted, I tried to learn,
I accepted the new ways of thinking more than
the answers they gave" (I).
Such a statement puts one on ones guard against any hasty
conclusion that Tillich is an existentialist in any
of the accepted meanings of that word, or even that he
has been profoundly influenced by the German brand of
existentialism. It will be one of ovir tasks to determine
the nature and extent of such an influence,, positive or
negative^ on his ethical philosophy
There is one other current of thought that
confronted Tillich dluring this, second period ^nd which
has left a mark on his thought even if only a negative one.
It is that of the so-called Neo-Orthodox theology of the
Swiss theologian Karl Earth. It was only when he moved
from Marburg to Dresden in 1928 becoming professor of the
Philosophy of Religion there, and in the following year
to Prankfurt, that he was continually being faced with
the task of defining his own dialectical method in relation
to that used by Earth in his so called 'Dialectical Theology',
Earth in his 2nd, edition of his COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE
TO THE denied an;yi)ossibility
of correlation or interaction between philosophy and
Theology, between God and creation. Por a time Tillich had
been considered one of the group of 'dialectical theologians'
who thought along Bartian lines® Now however their ways
parted. Earth's stand in 1922 was an absolute denial
of Tillichs whole conception of the relation of Religion
to culture» It cut across his key concept of his
(I) KEGLEY MD BRETALL : The Theology of Paul Tillich p 14,
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Philosophy of Religion, namely that a correlation is
possible between philosophy and theology. In several
articles in 1923 and 1924 'I'illich wgs hammering home this
point . Even then, and as time progressed and Tillich
began to lay down the foundations of hisybwn theological
system^it became increasingly clear that there was nothing
in common between Tillichs method and that of Earth's. In
fact they were diametrically opposed. In. I95I Tillich
remarked that it was most unfortunate that the name
dialectical theology had been applied to a theology
that was strongly opposed to any teind of dialectics
or mediation (I)® It was in opposition to Barth then
that Tillich made more precise his method of correlation (2)
The point is important because the general framwork of
Tillich's thought and his method of correlation which
is one of the essential aspects of that framework, has
had an extrinsic influence on some of Tillichs central
ethical ideas, not to speak of his philosophy as a whole
Influenced by Nietzsche, Heidegger and Barth
diaring this second period, we have seen how Tillich, •
commenced work on his Philosophy of Religion. Under the
impact of the German Revolution, however ,Most of his
energy was now directed towards social and political
philosophy and of course the relation of the Unconditonal
dimension to both. Most of his e'ssays and books published
during this period, including INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY
and certain articles, published for the first time in
english in 1952 in THE PROTESTANT ERA, but dating from
this period, evidence his interest in political, social
and historical matters. In the next period his thinking
returned to some of his earlier interestse
(1) The Protestant Er^-p. xxviii
(2) "e will examine this method of correlation ibn
the next chapter®
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ARTICLE III. The American Years:
theEinal Synthesis
On his dismissal from his professorship of
Philosophy in Prankfxirt University in 1933, Tillich was
forced to "begin life anew in the United States, at the age
of 47 and with very little, knowledge of the English
language. He acknowledges that he found it difficult at
first to adapt himself (I) but that his reception into
Union Theological Seminary in New York, on the
invitation of Reinhold Niehuhr , did smooth ijiatters
somewhat for him. His interest ±rt religious socialism, we
have just said^receded into the background and he returned
with new vigour to examining the unconditional dimension
in the personal sphere of the individual rather than
in the social sphere. He was now able to turn his
attention to the formulation of his Systematic Theology, a
pro:g.ect begun as early as 1925. Because of lecture
commitments in Union Seminary and elsewhere progress on
this work was slow. The 1st volT;une did not appear until
18 years later ( I95I ) , the 2nd. volume, six years
later and the final volume in 1963. It has been
described as a 20th. century Protestant Summa Theologica.(2)
Comprising over a thousand pages of close philosophical
and theological reasoning, it is a synthesis of his
key ideas in all spheres of thought, in which the
particular interests of his second period in social and
political matters are given their restricted place, '^s
the following chapter will be devoted to an analysis
of the central ideas in the three volumes of the
SYSTEPIATIC THEOLOGY, we will concentrate in the remainder
of this chapter , on the chief factors that influenced hi^ -rvouyrt
(1) pGLEY AND BEETALL : The Theology of Paul Tillich p 16
(2) i^e will say later what qualifications have to be
attached to this expression^ lu cy^s ,
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during his American years.
Besides finding in Union Seminary, a platform for
his philosophical and theological ideas, he fotmd there
also a place of common worship which was a new and
significant experience for him.
"It placed on me the obligation of expressing
myself in meditations and in Sermons as well
as in the abstract theological concepts of
lectures and essays" (l).
So- far three collections of these sermons have been made
and published THE SHAKING- OF THE FOIMDATIOITS (i950),
THE ETBRUAL NOW (1956), and THE 1TE¥ BEING (1963). In
these sermons some of his more abstract sad philosophical
and theological concepts of his SYSTBI'lATIC THEOLOGY have
been given a popular form, providing us at times , with
some interesting insights into certain ethical ideas.
I>uring his early years as a professor in Berlin
and Marburg (I9I9 - 1925 ), Tillich h;gd lectured on the
relationship between religion and psychoanalysis,. In
New York^from 1940 onwards^ he entered into closer contact
with the psychoanalytic movement® The problem of the
relationship between the theological and psychotherapeutic
understanding of man had come more and more to the
forefront of his^terest® This waS due partly to
university seminars, held close by him,on such subjects
as religion and health, and partly also to the great
practical and theoretical interest that Depth Psychology
had aroused in Union Seminary . Lastly personal friendship
with older and younger analysists, keapt him in touch
with the main trends in the psychoanalytical movement® (2).
KEGLEY AND BRETALL i The Theology of Paul' Tillich p 18
- . Ibid, p 18-19.
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We will, find that his statement that it is impossible
today to elaborate a Christian doctrine of man without
using the immense material, brought forth by depth psychology
especially significant when we come to examine what kind
of anthropology his ethics is built on. (I), Much of
the material^in what is his most widely read book,
THE COURAGE TO BE, (2) gives copio^ evidence of his
interest in psychoanalysis and his critical^though positive
attitude^towards it . He examines the idea of courage -
its coimterpart, anxiety - on different levels,
theological, philosophical, sociological, psychological.
The psychological analysis must be integrated into the
philosophical and theological dimensions of courage
and anxiety, if present day findings in psychoanalysis
are to be properly appreciated.
One must mention one other factor that had a bearing
on Tillich^'s thought during this latter period, even if
it wg,s only a negative one. Some years after his arrival
in New York he was invited to become a member of the
^Philosophy Club' and to partake in its monthly meetings.
It put him in touch with the mainstream of contemporary
VimAmerican philosophy, which he says influenced ^in the
following way
"American theology and Philosophy have influenced
my thinking in some respects® The spirit of the
English langiiage has demanded the clarification
of many ambiguities of my thought which were
caused by the mystical vagueness of classical
German Philosophy. The interdependence of theory
and practice in Anglo-Saxon culture has made me
free from the fascination of that kind of abstract
idealism which enjoys the system for the
systems sake (3)."
(1) Kegley and Bretall : The Theology of P.Tillich. P 19.
(2) This book is the material of the Terry lectures
delived?ed at Yale University and published in 1952
(3) The Protestant Era xxiv
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Other "foooks to appear aromid this time were
THE PROTESTANT BRA, (1948) and THE THEOLOGY OF CULTURE (196)
both being collections of articles, published previously
in various journals. The PROTBSTAMT Bra includes articles
written between 1929 and 194-6 an such diverse subjects
as Religion and History, Religion and Culture, Religion
and Ethics, Protestantism etc. THEOLOGY AM) CULTURE
contains material on similiar subjects written for various
journals between 1946 and 1957. One sees from the
predominant themes in both books , that the problem that
engages all his intention is the presence of the religious
dimension in every type of ci^ural creation, even if they
seem to show no relationship to religion in the narrower
sense of that word.
In 1955 another book BIBLICAL RELIGION AOT) THE
SEARCH FOR. ULTIMATE REALITY appeared in answer to a
recurring objection to all his work, namely, that there
is an opposition between the tfeeeiegieai philosophical
language used in his theological works and the concrete
imagery of Biblical langugge (I). He maintains that theology
does not have to abstain from using tfeeeiegieai philosophical
terminology but that on the contrary biblical symbols
drive inescapably to an ontological question and that the
answer given by theology necessarilly contains ontological
elements.
Apart from the above works and the three volumes of
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY-^-^¥^ which we will deal with later—
two other works were published during this latter period,
(l) This book is a slightly extended version of
the Richard Lectures delivered at the University of
Virginia in I951.
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which are of special interest to us. They indicate an
increasing interest in ethical problems. In. the first
work LOVE, POICBR, AND JUSTICE he is concerned, not just
with an ethical analgfsis of each of these three concepts,
"but with showing their ontological roots in the concept
of "being itself, and the inte3?relationship of concept
to each of the others il). The other work MORALITY AND BEYONjD
(1964) contains five chapters on the different aspects
of the relation of morality Religion as the titles of
the various chapters indicate The Religious Dimension
of the moral Imperative, The Religious source of the Moral
Demands, The Religious element in Moral Motivation,
The Trans-Moral Conscience, and lastly, Ethics in a
Changing World (2). "To what extent this interest in
ethical problems , constitutes a new direction in his
thought, or to what extent it was latent and implicit*^
in his earlier works , we will have to determine in
later chapters of this study.
In no sense does Tillich see this third period of
his life as a conversion to new ways of thought, -^rriving
in the United States at the age of 47 his mind had already
been moulded, by continental "h^'in particular^German streams
(1) This work contains the matter of the Firth Lectures
delivered in Nottingham,England , in 1953 and modified
in the light of seminars he gave on similiar subjects
he directed in Princeton University U.B.A-
(2) The first three lectures were originally the Jacob
Ziskind Memorial Lectures delivered at Dartmouth College U.S,
The last two are taken from his book THE PROTESTANT ERA.
24.
of thought and any changes that occTir are accidental
and secondary. Even if he does see himself mow
on a "boundary "between the 61d world and the New , he
regards his task as the preservation of the old values
and their translation into the terminology of the new
CTAlture (l)» He does acknowledge that his protracted
residence in the United States did enable him to rise
a"bove a formally unconscious provincialism "but that this
c -rue RE(2cr<o(,' of . . j.-udid not entail in any way^ his German formation or the
continental European tradition on which he was nurtured.
"That would mean that I had failed
from one provincialism into another".(2)
Tillich remained4s professor of Philosophical Theology
in Union Seminary up to 1955 when he reached the retiring
age. He was then invited by Harvard University to become
one of its visiting professors, where he has remained
up to the present day , though concentrating"on completing
his three volume work 'Systematic Theology.'
Conclusion
This introductary biographical survey of the various
influences that moulded the mind and work of Paul
Tillich, gives one some insight into the complex nature of
his thought and the variety of factors that influenced
his work. One is i^4 immediatly put on ones guard
against labelling him as a Grerman Idealist of the last
century (3) or of a Phenomonologist or Existentialist
of the 20th(4)»''^s he suggests himself the concept of the
IlT "kEGLEY Ik5 BREtALL : The Theology of Paul Tillich p 19
(2) theology and Culture p 159
(3) HEIYOOD THOMAS ; Paul Tillich ; an appraisal ^ Passim
(4) BREISACH : An Intoduction to Existentialism ^
One chapter on 'i'illich in which he is treated
as an existentialist.
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Tdorderline, denoting that he stands between different
philosophical streams of thoxight rather than in any one
of them, is the most fitting sjrmbail to descrine his
philosophical position. He is^then^neither an
existentialist, nor an idealist in any of the accepted
senses of these two words but both Idealism and Existentialism
-paradol^ically as it may seem - have made contributions
to his thought, as have other philosophical traditions® It
will be our task to examine these various contributions
in detail when we come to consider his ethical philosophy
in detail.
Can one point to significant developments or
changes in Tillich's philosophy , in particular in Tillich's
ethical philosophy ?
There are changes of
style, temper, and the manner of formulating problems* These
of course are part and parcel of every academic career, and
can be expected especially in TiiUch who attended or
lectured in so many different German universities before
making his biggest change of all - that from the'old'
world to the'new' o However Tillich himself denies that
there are any far reaching or basic changes in his
doctrine or in his ideas. As late as 1952 he remarked
"I Was struck by how much I thought to be a
recent achievement, was already explicitely
or at least implicitely contained in them^(his
earlier writings')" (I).
Such a statement puts one on one's guard against reading
development into his thought where perhaps all was
implicitely contained there before hand. V/hat appears to
be the most significant change in his thought , WaS the
swing towards historical, social and political problems
during the 2nd period and the return to problems where
"("iT ~The""Protestant Era p.
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the individual comes to the forefront again in the 3rd,
period. It is debatable whether or not one could call
this a radical development or change in his thought. He
is concerned with the unconditional dimension in tee%h
the social aspect of reality at one period and the
in its individual and personal aspect at the next.
Moreover in his final synthesis SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY ,
both are considered by him and finally synthesis^so much
so^that he remarks one cannot be separated from the
other (l).
It is only after we have examined each aspect
of Tillich's ethical doctrine in detail, and considered
it in relation to his philosophy as a whole that we will
be in a position to discuss this problem of i,
development in 1
ethical thought.
•3>e\;e^opwe-'^
his thought and especially ^^in nis
(I), Gf. Systematic Theology ¥eii- Vol I. p 74.
and Vol II. p 317.
Also Love. PoTger and Justice p fl-99.
CHAPTER II.
DOGTRIUAL INTRODUCTION :
THE INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK
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As Paul Tillich's SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY is the crowning
synthesis of his life's work, a brief analysis of the
contents of it's three volumes, together with occasional
references to earlier works, will serve not only as a
doctrinal introduction to his tho-ught hut will also
indicate the general framework — philosophical and
theological — in which his moral philosophy is to be
found. Just as there is an increasing awareness of the
necessity of taking into consideration the overall contents
and general plan of the Summa Theologica of St» Thomas
Aquinas, when investigating any particular philosophical
doctrine found therein (l), so also it is necessary to
see the general framework of Paul Tillich's SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY, if we are to appreciate adequately, the
relationship and the place of his moral philosophy, to the
rest of his thought. His ethical doctrines cannot
be torn away,tout a fait^, from their philosophical and
theological context without certain points getting out of
focus# A clear understanding of the nature of this
intellectual framework,then, is an indispensible requisite
for understanding his ethical philosophy.
(I) For instance cf R.P.L. I945y p 5-20 and ^01-316 where
YM STEENBERGHEN makes this point in regard to St. Thomas'
natiaral Theology. Also his book Dieu Cache and Edward
SILLEMS : WaKse of Thinking about God. ]>
The same could be said of St. Thomas's moral
Philosophy, cf S.PINCKAERS ; Le Renouveau de la Morale
passim ^
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In this chapter then we will consider in turn what Tillich
conceives the nature and method of philosophy to "be, in
contrast with the nature and method of Theology ( Art. I. )j
what the essential philosophical themes of the five parts
of this work are ( Art« IIo ) ; and finally the place of
moral philosophy in this overall synthesis (Art. III. ).
Article I. The Nature and Method of Philosophy.
Ao The System In the Preface to Systematic Theology
Tillich remarks that his system is,
in no way, a 'Summa' according to the Scolastic meaning of
that word. It makes no attempt to give an exhaustive treatment
to all theological and philosophical problems. His aim, he says^
is to present the method and structure of a theological
system, carried through in a 'continual correlation'with
Philosophy (l). It is this correlating of theological and
philosophical doctrines that leads him to describe the overall
synthesis as a system® In. each of the five parts of Systematic
Theology, there are two sections, the first being a philosoph
ical analysis of some aspect of htiman existence, culminating
in some paradox or ambiguity, insoluble at the philosophical
level and the second is the theological answer to this
paradox or ambiguity, in the light of theological sources
and norms8 ^13 correlating process runs through the whole
work from beginning to end and is implicitjf' in many of his
earlier works.
He maintains that the system is not deductive in the
(I) Systematic Theology Volume I. Preface p ix - x
The three volumes of Systematic Theology will be referred
to henceforth as Systematic Theology I, II, and III.
respectively.
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in the sense that a mathematical system can "be said to
be so. Ihere is no derivation or deduction of theological
assertions from philosophical starting points. He remarks
that such has often been attempted in philosophy but with
little success® "^hat characterises his system is not
deduction but consistency.
"It is a totality made up of consistent
but not of deduced propositions" (l)«
Neither does he regard his system as a body of eternal
truths, definitively achieved once and for all time. His
system is not a prison of thought turned in upon itself
in which all creative thought is stiffled® Rather does he
see it as a dynamic and flexible unity, open to new insights
and in a continual state of reconstruction*. This pertains
to his moral philosophy as much as to any other part of his
system. In conclusion he remarks that the 'system' stands
between the 'summa* and the 'essay®.
"The'summa' de^ls explicitely with all actual
and many potential problems. The'essay' deals
explicitely with one actual problem, - '^he 'system'
deals with a group of actual problems, which
demand a solution in a special situation" (2)
Philosophy and Theology. Tillich's concept of
Philosophy is closely
bound up with his definition of Theology^ He gives two
formal criteria of the latter.
"The. object of Theology is what concerns us
ultimately. Only those propositions are
(1) Systematic Theology I. p 66
(2) ibid. p 67.
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theological, which deal with^olDjecti in so
far as it can become a matter of ultimate concern
for us" (I).
The word concern here conveys the idea that a theological
problem cannot be approached with detached objectivity ; there
is subjective involvement® It is a matter of'total surrender',
of 'infinite passion' . It is ultimate or unconditsbnal
concern unlike all the problems that arise in philosophy
or in the particular sciences which for Tillich are all
conditional in some way or another. The basic characteristic
of theology then, is that it is existential in the sense
outlined above.
As if this were not enough, Tmich adds a second formal
criteria of Theology, '- '^he ultimate concern that Theology
lieals with is one "that determines our being or non-being" (2).
Our existence is continually threatened by things and events
Many of these have never any ultimate concern for us. It is
only when our being — that is the whole of human reality,
its structure and its meaning — is threatened, that we are
faced with a theological problem. This second criteria also
brings out the existential aspect of theology according to
Tillich,
What is Philosophy concerned with or is it contradictory
to speak about philosophical concern after what we have
said about theology ?
its he can find no generally
accepted definition of philosophy he formulates his own.
"Philosophy is that cognitive approach to
reality, in which reality as such is the object (3)
or
"Philosophy is that cognitive endeavour in which
the question of being is asked " (4)
(1) Systematic Theology I. pI5
(2) Ibid. pI7
(3) Ibid. p22. r. r-(4) Biblical Religion and the search for Ultimate ideality p 5
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Philosophy tries to understand 'being as such* or
'reality as such'. It is an enquiry into the structures,
categories and concepts which are presupposed in the
cognitive encounter with eve3?y realm of reality (l).
To ask what is the general structiire of reality that makes
experience possible is for •^illich to ask a philosophical
question* What characterises Philosophy then is.that5even-
though it is concerned with reality or being as such, there
0
is an absence of existential involvment
Matters become complicated when we consider the
relation of one to the 6i)her , of Philosophy to Theology,
Tillich acknowledges that theology necessarilly asks the same
question as philosophy. That which concerns us ultimately
must belong to reality as a whole.
"Theology, when dealing with our ultimate concern,
presupposes in every sentence, the structure of
being, its categories, laws, and concepts" (2)
He hastens to add however, that though both theology and
philosophy deal with the structure of reality, they both
deal with it in different ways® Philosophy deals with
the structure of being itself ; theology deals with the
meaning of being for us (3)* From this baSic difference
flows all other differences, $he philosopher, like the
scientist tries to maintain a detached objectivity towards
being ; the Theologian on the other hand is involved,
engaged, 'looking at being with passion, love, and
commitment'. Mofeover the philosopher looks at the whole
of reality in seeking the structure of being ; the
theologian restricts himself to that place where that which
concerns him ultimately is manafested, namely , the ^Logas
(1). Systematic Theology I, p 22.
(2). Ibid. p 24.
(3): Ibid, p 25.
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manifesting itself in aparticular historical situation or
event' (I), ^he primary interest of the philosopher is
theoretical ; that of the Theologian is existential.
Tillich hj,s defined philosophy and theology in such a
way that the points of divergence are counterbalanced by
points of convergence. It is necessary to show not only
the points of difference oi" separation but also the points
of contact or identity. His whole method of correlation
rises or falls on this points.
The converging trends are at work from both sides.
tl
Every creative philosopher is a hidden
theologian. He is a theologian,in the degree
to which his existential situation and his
jiltimate concern shape his philosophical vision" (2).
The divergence however remains, as the Philosopher does not
intend to be a theologian,, The Philosopher tends to t\jrn
away from his existential situation towards pure reality.
The tension and conflict that this causes is part of the
burden and greatness of the philosopher®
The theologian carries an analogous burden® He turns
towards the existential situation in order to make clear,
the universal validity of what concerns him ultimately. An
element of philosophical detachment is called for, but it is
this very detachment that can destroy the necessary involve
ment of Paith«,. The conflict and tension that ensues is part
of the burden and greatness of every theologian
Finally Tillich maintains that because of the particular
way he has defined philosophy and theology, there can not -be
one the one hand any conflict between them« A conflict can
only arise within theology or within philosophy j it cannot
(I)» Systematic Theology I. p 23. Tillich is deferring here,
g4wzae to the Incarnation of the 'Hew Being' - Christ.
Systematic Theology I. p 29.
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arise "between them» On the other hand the concept of a
'Christian Philosophy ' is also excluded,(l).
C, The Method As WaS said! earlier-, Tillich has
of Correlation. defined philosophy and theology
in such a way that correlation
necessarilly followse The method of correlation he proposes
seeks to avaoid supernaturalist, naturalist and dualist
methods of relating philosophy and theology. It explains
the content of the Christian revelation in the light of a
philosophical analysis of human situations. Philosophical
questions and theological answers are in mutual interdependence.
The Christian religion is only meaningful , I'illich
contends, in so far as it is correlated with questions
arising out of such analysisHe states for instance that
only those who have experienced the shock of transitoriness
or the anxiety in which they become aware of their own
finitude, which is the threat of non being, can understand
what the notion of God means, (2). the problem of the
nature of being, then, particularly my own being, leads
ultimately to the problem of G-od and the problem of G-od
for Tillich is a 'theological 'problem in his own sense of
that word, or rather the problem of the nature of being calls
for a Theological answer which itevelation alone can give ,
Tillich warns us that in this process of correlation both
the philosopher and theologian remain autonomous, -^s a
theologian he does not tell himself what is philosophically
true; as a philosopher he does not tell himself what is
(1) Tillich arrives at these conclusions after some detailed
and close reasoning in the Introduction to Systematic
Theology I® p 3-74. We merely state the conclusions here®
(2) Systematic ^^^heology I» p 69®
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Theologically true. However as a philosopher he cannot
help seeing human existence a,nd existence in general
in such a way that the Christian symhols appear
meaningful and understandable. Even as a Philosopher
Ihis eyes are pattially focussed Toy his ultimate concern'(I).
He falls back finally on a distinction between ma tter and
form to indicate the relation between philosophy and
theology.
"In respect to content, the Christian answers
are dependent on the revelatory events in which
they appear ; in respect to form they are
dependent on the structure of the question
which they answer" (2).
•^s we shall see later Tillichs definitions of
Philosophy and '-^^heology and their relationship to one
another have had consequences in the ethical sphere.
In fact here is the source of one of the chief difficulties
that can be brought against his moral philosophy, namely,
that of its rational autonomy. However , it is as well
to remark at this stage that Heywood Thomas oversimplifies
Tillichs treatment of the relationship of Philosophy to
Theology in j^sserting
"His method of defining philosophy and Theology... ,
is exceedingly like a mathematical formula in
which X = Y, 2 = Y and therefon^ Z = X " (3).
According to Thomas^Tillichs defin^ions would be
tautologous® Such a comparison to a mathematical formul
ation can in no way do justice to the complex relation
of Philosophy and '^'heology outlined by Tillich, where the
points of convergence g.nd divergence are carefully
established.
(1). Systematic Theology I,, p 7I»
(2), Ibid. p 72.
(5). Paul ^illich ; ^ Appraisal p 42.
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Article II«. Survey of Philosophical themes
in Systematic Theology .
We have seen how the method of correlation demands
that each of the five parts of his work Systematic
Theology include two sections, of first of which contains
a philosophical analysis of some aspect of human
existence, leading up to some question or paradox, and
the succeeding section containing the theological answer
to this question or paradox.
"This division is the backbone of the structure
of the present system" (l).
What follows is a brief summary of the philosophical
sections of the five parts, or rather the central
philosophical themes that play a basic role in his
philosophy as a whole and which have some essential
bearing on his moral philosophy. ¥e will examine the
philosophical section of each of the five parts in turn.
PART I. Tillich is of the opinion that Epistomology
shoxild run through the whole system but for
practical reasons he decided to'split off
some of the material from each of the other parts,
combining it together to form an integral critical section.
Because the nature of reason and the norms and sources
of Theology are presupposed in the whole system, he decided
eventually to treat them in a place apart. This introductary
critical section^then.^which constitutes the first part of
(I) 'Systematic Theology I» p 74.
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Systematic Theology, presents us with an analysis
of mans rationality, and the questions and paradoxes
implied in the finitude^ estrangement and ambiguities
of reason. It also deals with the answers Revelation
provides to these questions or paradoxes*, Hence the title
of this section is Reason and i^ev^lation. (I)»
Tillich , first of all, makes a distinction
between 'ontological reason' and 'technical reason'.
Ontological reason is the structure of the mind which
enables it to grasp and to transform reality (2). Its
cognitive nature is only one of its components^ In
addition there are aesthetic, theoretical, practical,
detached, passionate, subjective and objective elements
in Ontological -i^eason. Technical reason on the other
hptnd reduces ontological reason to the mere capacity of
reasoning
"Only the cognitive side of the classical
concept remains and with the cognitve realm
only those cognitive acts which deal with the
discovery of means for ends" (3)
Technical reason^then^impoverishes reality.
Tillich then makes a further distinction within
ontological reason itself. One must distinguish between
ontological reason in its essential perfection, and
ontological reason in the different stages of its
actualization, in existence, life, and history (4). It
is only reason in the second sense that becomes subject
to finitude, ambiguity, conflict and division® In
reason in its actualised or existential state all kinds
(1) The philosophical analysis of reason corresponds to
Systematic Theology I. pp 79-112.
(2) Ibid, p 80
(3) Ibid. p 81
(4) Ibid. p 83.
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of tensions and divisions can arise, which militate
against one another and which call for some kind of solution,
For instance the polar conflict between s-ubjective and
objective reason and the ensuing ambiguities and conflicts
that arise because of it, points to something which
transcends them both^ Neither idealism, Pluralism, Monism,
or Idealism have provided a satisfactory answer according
to Tillich, Only what he refers to as the 'Depth of Reason'
or 'estatic Reason' can do so.
The 'depth of reason' is the expression of
something that is not reason but which precedes
reason and which is man&fest through it, -^eason
in both its objective and subjective structure,
points to something which appears in these
structures but which transcends them in power
and meaning " (I).
This pointing of reason to something beyond itself in
this epistomological section , has its counterparts in all
the other parts of Tillichs philosophy and hence in all the
other Parts of Systematic Theology. One is not surprised
to come across expressions such as the God beyond all the
Grods of natural Theology or a moral philosophy beyond
morality (2) Here he has fo\md a name for reason which
is beyond reason ; it is the depth of reason and it
coBUicides with essential reason (3).
It is this 'depth of reason' then , that unites
the two poles of subjective and objective reason and
which surmotints all the ambiguities and tensions which
(1) Systematic Theology I« p 88
(2) The title of one of his books on ethical philosophy
is Beyond Morality.
(3).This latter statement Calls for more qualifications
which we will pass over here.
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arise in our existential situation. For Kant it was in
the sphere of moral experience that the Unconditional
broke through. It waS the only point at which
the prison of finitude was open» For Tillich the
Unconditional is manafest in reason itself that is in the
'depth of reason'
"The depth of reason is essentially manafest in
reason. But it is hidden in reason under the
conditions of existence"(l)
It is only at certain passing moments now that the
depth of reason breaks through. Participating in the
ambiguities and contradictions of existence, actual reason
moves through finite categories, through self destructive
conflicts, through ambiguities in its quest for what is
unambiguous♦ For '-'^'illich this is the quest for Revelation.
H'J'e will note here three forms of conflict, or
ambiguity that pertain to reason in its existential state
and which have ramifications also in the moral order.
(a) Autonomy and Heteronomy.
In reason in its
•)
existential state a conflict occurs between autonomous
and heteronomous reason* Autonomy in this context means
the law of reason, which he finds in himself as a rational
being. Heteronomy on the other hand comes from outside
and imposes a strange law on all or on one of the functions
of reason (2)a The real conflict arises when this law
from outside represents the Depth of reason itself but
the individual is unaware of it.
For Tiiiich autonomy and heteronomy are both
rooted in thenonomous reason which he describes as
(1). Systematic Theology I. p 89.
(2). Ibid. p 93.
59.
'autonomous reason united with its own depth' (l).
However in our actual existence theononomous reason
has broken apart and autonomous and heteronoraous reason
have both gone their own way., '- '^here is continual striving
towards the 'theonomous situation' in our present state. It
can be only partially realised®, ithis striving^Tillich
interprets^as the quest for Revelation. (2)
(b) Relativism and Absolutism. (3)
Essential reason
unites in harmony an absolute and relative polarity which
corresponds to static and dynamic elements^ '^he static
element prevents reason from losing its identity. 2!he
dynamic element is the power of reason and it actualises
itself rationally in the process of life. Under the
conditions of actual existence, the two elements are torn
from each other and move against one another, Tillich
applies these two notions in many different spheres — in
the fields of science, politics, aesthetics etc, ThSasr
application to Moral philosophy, where we are concerned
with the absolute and relative, static and dynamic
elements of the moral law will be particularly interesting
to us,
(c) Formalism and Emotionalism, (4)
In essential
reason are united but again as in the previous two cases
their unity is disrupted under the conditions of
existence® Neither is this polarity an exclusively
111 _Sxstematic Theology_ I 2 94.
(2) The answer to this quest is to be found in
Systematic Theology I. pp II8-I74.
(I) Ibid. pp 96 - 99
(4) Ibid, pp 99 - 104.
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epistomological one. In legal justice for example
formalism places exclusive eii&phasis according to Tillich
on the structural necessity of justice, without
considering the adequcy of the legal form to the human
reality it is supposed to shape.
"The tragic alienition "between law and life is a
consequence of the separation of form from
emotion " (l).
This separation of form and emotion is again a quest
for a truth that is heyond reason® It too' is a quest for
•Revelations. Consequently the whole of the 2nd section
of this first part of Systematic %eology is devoted to
the theological answer to all these questions, "fiie
reconciliation of all these conflicts must all be sought
for beyond philosophy® ^hey must be sought for in the
Christian Revelation^
Though we have only given a bare outline of the
philosophical section of this 1st • Part, sufficient has
been said to indicate the repercussions some of his
epistomological doctrines v^ill have in the ethical sphere.
This is particularly true of the three polarities
of Autonomy and Heteronomy, Absolutism and Relativism,
and iJormalism and Emotionalism, outlined above, all of
which have consequences in the ethical sphere.
(l) Systematic theology I« p 100.
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PARQ? II. The philosophical section of this part,
analysses mans existence aS it actually is,
its character of self-contradiction and
estrangement® It reveals the finitude of man and
because of his Heideggerian starting point that man is
the gateway to being it reveals^also, the finitude of
everything that has existence. To this philosophical
analyses of being-^ corresponds the theological answer which
is the Infinite, Hence the title of this second part of
Systematic Theology is 'Being and God'.
For Tillich the question of being arises as a shock to man
- a metaphysical shock of the possibility of non-being, (l).
However he does not commence with an analysis of being as
such but with what he calls 'concepts' or 'principles*
of being
"Ontology is possible because there are
concepts which are less universal than being
but more universal than any ontic concept -
that is more universal than any concept
designating a realm of being " (2).
These concepts, he states have been called 'principles'
'categories' or'ultimate notions' and the human mind has
worked for thousands of years in their discovery,
elaboration and organizatione He himself distinguishes
between four levels of ontological concepts;
le The basic ontological structure which is the
implicite conditional of the ontological question
2® The elements which constitute the ontological
structure.
(1) Systematic Theology I. p 181.
(2) Systematic Theology I® p 181.
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The characteristics of "being which are the
conditions of existence.
4« '-^he categories of "being and knowing.
As we are concerned here with the basic framework of
Tillichs metaphysics, on which his moral philosophy
ultimately is built, a brief analysis of each of these
four levels of ontological concepts or principles is
necessary®
I. a?he Basic Ontological structure.
When Tillich speaks about the basic ontological structure
he has in mind the subject-object stHucture of being, or
what he refers to.^at times,as the Self-World structure.
This interdependence of the self and the world is the
basic ontological structure, on which all the others
depend, Man experiences this structure in himself. He
experiences himself as having a world to which he
belongs (l). His ability to do this is an essential
prerequisite, the essential prerequisite, for the
constitution of the moral act, as we skhll see later.
Here as in many other places in Tillich's philosophy,
one will notice similiarites between Tillich's ideas and
those of the contempoary current of continental
philosophy, known as existential phenomenology. For instance
Tillich's analysis of the subject-object structure of being,
seem to indicate many points of contact with what has been
been stated to be the primitive fact of existential
(I) Systematic Theology I® pp 186-190.
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phenomonology, as presented by Luiopen and Dondeyne (l) '
Without going into the matter further at this stage one
could remark that though Tillich was intimately acqiiainted
•with the works' of Husserl and the earlier writings of
Heidegger, the two founder - fathers of existential
phenomonologyj—any similiarities between his thought and
this movement must be tempered with the fact that he was
pi^oundly influenced also by late I9th.German Idealist
Philosophy and also by the fact; that he takes usually
an original stand against any philosophy he comes in
contact with*
2® The Elements which constitute the ontological structure
The elements, the second kind of principle or concept that
Tillich deals with in his ontological analysis of being,
are twin structures , which show the threefold polar
character of the basic subject-object structure of being.(2)
They are Individualism and Universality (or participation)^
Dynamism and ^'orm, ^'reedom and Destiny® "^gain all three
have consequences in the ethical sphere, so we will take
a quick review of each pair.
(a) Individ-ualism and Participation, (3)
These elements
are not characteristics of a special sphere of being. They
are both ontological elements and therefore qvialities of
everything that exists® "^he fact that the two poles
are interdependent is particularly evident, when one
considers this structure in man.
(1) cf. WILLIAM A LUIJPEN : Existential Phenomomology p 34
Albert DONDEYNE : Contemporary Europian Thought
and Christian Faith p 25 -
(2) Systematic Theology I» pp 195 - 206.
(3) Ibid. p 193.
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When individualization reaches its perfect form in man
we have a person and when participation reaches its
perfect form we have a communion of persons. In other
words there is reciprocal causality between the two poles ,
one impling the other and the proportion of perfection that
is f@-attained in one pole is proportionate to that
attained in the other .
"Communion is participation in another
complet^y centred and completely individual self" (l),
%e person as the fully developed individual self is
impossible without communion with other fully developed
selves® ilach individual discovers himself throiagh
the resistence he meets with in other persons♦ In the
resistence of the other person, the person is born and so
also, we may add is morality* '-^-'he twin-ontological
elements of Individualism and jsarticipation have
mu^ to say concerning the starting point of Tillichs
moral philosophy.^as we shall see later®
(b) Dynamics and form.
It is easy to see how both
these elements also apply to every being (2) if we keep
in mind that dynamics for Tillich corresponds to potency ,
that is to the potentiality of being». In mans immediate
experience this polarity of dynamics and form appears as
the polar structure of vitality and intentionality.
Vitality is the power which keeps a living being alive and
growing® In man this growth is bound to no a priori
limitations.
"Man is able to create a world beyond the given
He creates the technical and the spiritual realms".(3)
(1) %stematic Theology I, pI95.
(2) Both these elements apply even to God but how this
is explained is not our concern here
cf. Sustematic Theology I p 199 and pp 261-280,
(3) Systematic Theology I, pI99.
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Mans vitality , however, is conditioned "by his intentionality.
or what Tillich says coiild be called 'actiialising reason
The dynamic or vital polarity in man is creative "but it AA<?f>/e
is -undirected or chaotic^ It is directed or formed "by the
pole of intentionality "by which it is related to
meaningful and universal structures* In short these
two elements, correspond to the static and dynamic elements
in man and they are such that their mutual interdependence
canniot escape us. ^thical norms and laws will have
to be in line with this twofold structure so that what
one considlers to be the place of static and absolute
elements or contents in the ethical sphere ,as well.^as
dynamic and relative factors, will have to be in accord
with this basic metaphysical polarity of d3mamics and form.
(c) ^'reedom and Destiny (l).
It is obvious that TiHichfis
views on the nature of freedom will have consequences in
the ethical sphere. Man is man because he has freedom. He
has freedom however according to Tillich only in polar
interdepemdence on destiny® %e counterpart to freedom is
not determinism but a complex pole called SLestiny, which
has ramifications throughout the ^hole of his philosophy.
Here it will suffice to say that destiny points to the
situation in which man finds himself, facing the world , yet
belonging to it at the same time,
"Destiny is myself as given, formed by nature,
history and myself® It is the basis of my
freedom" (2),.
This polarity no more than the other two is not confined
to man. Since they both constitute an ontological
polarity, everything that participates in being must
participate in this polarity. As man is the only being
(1) Systematic Theology I pp 201-206
(2) Ibid«. p 202.
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who^ posseses freedom in "the strict sense the application
of this polarity to other beings is possible only by way of
analogy. Hence Tillich will speak of the polarity
of spontaneity and law , in regard not only to living
beings but also in relation to the inorganic worlds
Tillich's concept of freedom is a complex one ,
constituting an integral part of his whole system® It
plays a crucial part not only in his ethics of the individual
but also in his social ethics (l)®
3^ THe Characteristics of being which are the conditions
of existence.
This third level of ontological concepts expresses the power
of being to exist and the difference between essential and
existential being. In all ontologies the duality
of essential and existential being is seen according to
Tillich, and in all^the question of their relation to
one another is raised. The answer is prepared by the
polarity of freedom and destiny on the second level of
analysis but freedom as such is not the basis of existence
but rather freedom in unity with finitude
Finite freedom is the turning point, from
being to existence" (2)
It is the analysis of finitude in its polarity xirith
infinity aS well as in its relation to freedom and destiny,
to being and non being, to essence and existence , which
is the task of Ontology in this third level.
(1). Tillich's concept of freedom will be examined in
the following chapter in relation to his c oncept of •
the moral act and moral imperative..Its social aspect
will be dealth with in the chapter on 'Social Morality'
(2) Systematic Theology I® 184s
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It is at this level that he introduces the concept of
anxiety aS expressing finitude from the inside a It has
here an ontological connotation,signifying 'man directed
towards nothingness'.
4, The categores of heing and knowing.
At the fourth and final level of ontological concepts
Tillich analyses are the categories of Time, space,
causality and substance. I^hey are the basic forms of
thought and "being and participate in the natxire of
finitude, "^hey are not logical bjit ontological forms
and so are present in everything. They reveal their
ontological nature throTigh their double relation to being
and to non-being.
"They express being but at the same time they
express non being to which everything, is subject"(l)
This is the reason why he can refer to them as forms
of finitude . -^ach category expresses not only a union of
being an non being-^hat is in relation to the world ,'from
the outsidebut also a union of anxiety and courage y-that
is as seen from the inside in relation to the self. (2).
This summary account of the aaal-ysis of being, carried
out by Tillich at the four levels outlined above, gives
one some idea of how vast and how complex is the
ontological fovindation on which his ethical philosophy is
built. In the light of this foundation, many of the
statements he makes about moral matters , which at first
sight appear disconcerting, acquire a new force and
a new consistency
(1) Systematic Theology I. p 214.
(2) His analysis of these concepts of Time, space , causality
and substance have much less bearing on his moral
philosophy than other parts of his ontology, so there
i.s no need to develope them further here.
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PART III. This part studmis the gap that exists
between mans essential natiire and it's
distortion in existence, '- '^he estrangement
of oiir existential state and the ambiguities of life as
deli^iated in this part^ are coneequences of mans
finitude as examined in the previous part® Corresponding
to mans existential self-estrangement, and the questions
and paradoxes implied in this situation,is the anawer or
answers that Revelation gives in "Ha© New Being' - Christ.
Hence the title of this third part is 'Existence and the Christ!
Tillich uses a dymythologised account of the Old Testament
story of the Pall to indicate the transition from
essence to existence. It is finite freedom working
within the framework of universal destiny that makes this
transition possible, '-^'illich follows Kierkegaard closely
here in his analysis of mans finite freedom. Man is aware
of his finite freedom and this awareness is anxiety, '- '^his
anxiety reveals to him the possibility of the non
fulfillment of his potentialities. It indicates that he is
a being directed towards nothingness. It reveals to him
the split between his essential nature and his actual
existence. This transition from essence to existence is
a universal quality of all finite beings. It is manjgifest
in every individual person in 'the transition from
dreaming innocence to actualization and guilt'. (l) In other
words it is apparent in anxiety in all its forms.
As will be seen this distinction between mans essential
nature and his existential estranged state is central to
Tillich's moral philosophy. The very notion of command,or of
norm, or of law are rooted in it and flow from it.
(l) Systematic Theology II, p 42.
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Tillich gives §. detailed, description of mans
existential estrangement in this part, and also its
destructive implications He interpre^Ets traditional
concepts such as sin, unbelief,hubris (total self
centredness) and concupiscence as marks of this
estrangement, giving them a connotation that fits in with
his own particular view of things.
All these different forms of estrangement
contradict mans essential "being, The elements
of essential being which should move in harmony with
each other^now tend to annihilate each other and the whole
to which they belong® Disruption of the self-world
structure,for instance, means that man loses not only
himself but also his world» '- '^he loss of one implies the
loss of the other. For Tillich this disruption of the
self is the basic mark of evil
"Self-loss ^as t^e first and basic mark of evil,
is the loss of one's determining centre ; it is
the disintegration of the centred self by
disruptive forces which cannot be brought into
unity" (I),
He conceives moral evil in terms of psychological
disruption* The fjilrther the disruption goes the more the
being of man as man is threatened. Tillich developes this
point fT^her in Part IV of "Systematic Theology when
examining the nature of the moral act as such«
This disruption of the basic self world
structure of being which corresponds to moral evil in man,
leads also to the disruption of the other polar elements
of being® The harmonious tension that should exist
between Freedom and Destiny can be so disturbed in our
(l) Systematic Theology II p 71.
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existential state that it can appear on the one hand
aS arbitrariness and on the other hand as. mechanical
necessity. Where dynamics and form are separated or
disrupted, d3mamics can become a formless urge for
self-transcendence; form can become external or
heteronomous law(l). In this situation there is a continual
flight from chaos to law and from law to chaos. It is
evident from this statement of ^illich's that he shares
the Lutherian opposition to law as such and that
his ethics is not going to be an ethics of law. Lg-w
must be transcended he says® However it should be
also evident that his opposition to law cannot be
reduced to an inherited! Lutherian prejudice. No doubt
this conditioned his attitude to law and may even
have given his mind the vital push which turned his mind
in another direction® Be that as it may^his attitude
to law is now underpined by basic metaphysical attitudes
towards this polarity of dynamics and form (2), Lastly
the disruption of the balance between participation and
individualization can lead on the one hand to the
individual being isolated and imprisoned in his own finitude
and on the other his being swalloed up by some
all pervading totalitarian forces in which he becomes a
mefe object.
Tillich developes further consequences of this state of
estrangement in his analysis of Death, Finitude, G-uilt,
Suffering, Lonliness and Despair. As in the two previous
parts a theological section follows in which the
(1). Systematic Theology II. p 74
(2)9 This point will be further developed in the chapter
devoted to Tillichs concept of law.
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solution to all these disruptive forces at work in the
state of estrangement , is stated to "be found in 'The New
Being' - that is in Christ® Revelation indicates the
way® in which the gap "between essence and existence , our
essential nature and our state of existential estrangement
can "be overcome.
PART IV. This part is "based on the fact that the
essential as well as the existential
characteristics pointed out in the previous
sections are a"bstractions and that in reality they appear in
the complex and dynamic unity which is called 'life',
"The power of essential being is ambiguously
present in all existential distortions" (l).
Life,that is, being in its actuality displays such
a character in all its processes® This part therefore
gives an analysis of man as living and to the question
implied in the ambiguities of life it gives the answer
which is the Spirits So the title of this part is
Life and the Spirit.
Tiiiich rejects 'all hierarchical conceptions of
different realms of being' - organic, inorganic,
psychological, spiritual and replaces them by the complex
notion of 'the multi-dimensional unity of life*. He
replace^ the idea of level by that of dimension - another
metaphor he admits but one which connotes the different
realms of being in such a way that there cannot be
mutual interference, '^ ^he unity of life is seen above
its conflicts.
•^These conflicts are not denied but they are
not derived from the hierarchy of levels, -^or Tillich
they are the consequences of the ambiguity of life
(l). Systematic Theology I. p. 75
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processes.- Wo longer is there a sharp distinction between
different levels, %ere is rather a progressive
realization from one level into another and becamse Tillich
thinks that the word 'dimension' conveys this idea better
he prefers to use it. It also covers better the
instances , where the actualization of one 'level'
is dependent on the actualization of another. (l),
"hat is of particular interest to us inTillich's
doctrine of multi-dimensional unity of life is the
relation of the psychological and spiritual dimensions
and the bearing this has on morality,
tillich distinguishes between three functions of life
which correspond to the three polarities of being we
have already met with in Partll of Systematic Theology .
A) S-^lf - Integrationfi^^h^] '^^ !^?^ identity is
established, ^lorresponding to the polarity of
Individualization and Participation it is a continuous
movement from centredness to alteration and from alteration
back to centredness (2).
B) Self - Creation is the function of producing
new eentegs® It is the principle of growth which
determines the process of self creation so it is not
surprising that it corresponds to the polarity of
dynamics and form in being.
C) S^- Transcending function is the process in which
life drives beyond itself as finite life. It pertains to
the polarity of Freedom and ^estiny.
(1) Systematic Theology III. p 55. 16.(2) Ibid, p 33.
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In our actual estranged state, th.e internal
functioning of each of these three processes is
disrupted as is also the external harmony that should
exist between them. Selfiintegration can "be
disrupted "by disintegration, self creation by dest--ruction
and self transcendence by profanity. The unity of
each prooesB^^fhreatened. Por instance in the self-
integration process there occurs the ambiguities of the
moral law, of the moral imperative and of moral motivation,
Corresponding to the process of self-creation are the
ambiguities of culture and to the self-transcending
function, the ambiguities of religion. %e process
of self-integration will be examined in greater detail
in the next chapter gs it is directly concerned with
the moral sphere. Here we have merely condensed in a
very summary way the chief headings and divisions
of the philosophical section of this fovirth part of
Systematic Theology. It will at least give some
indication of the over-all pattern or framework in
which Tillich's moral philosophy is to be fo\md in this
final work and which is presupposed in other works of
Paul Tillich
All these different kinds of ambiguity are a
quest for unambiguous life, which the Revelation of the
Spiritual Presence or simply the Spirit provides, in some
measure or another-,
'^ART 7. The final part of Systematic Theology gives
an analysis _
of mans historical existence, o
the questions implied in the ambiguities of
history comes the answer 'The Kingdom of Godl Hence the
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title of this part is History and the Kingdom of G-od .
He acknowledges that the historical dimension is
intimately hound up with the other parts of Systematic
Theology but for practical purposes - as with Part I -
he decided to treat it apart. He asserts also that the
problem of history has traditionally been treated
separately
"Every doctrine of life must include a doctrine
of the historical dimension of life in general,
and of human history as the most comprehensive
life process in particular...Any description
of the ambiguities of life must include a
description of the ambiguity of life under the
historical dimension(l)«"
¥e see then that this final part is a logical extension of
the fourth Part. It is the all-embracing character of
the historical dimension - which is present in all other
dimensions that finally makes him decide to treat it apart#
Briefly this part deals with the structure of
historical processes, the logic of historical knowledge,
the ambiguities of historical existence, the meaning of the
historical movement and the relation of all these
to the answer Revelation provides - namely the Kingdom of
God,
Like all the other parts it too haS certain
sections which have a particular bearing on our study
of Tillich's moral philosophy, in particular his key
concept of his Philosophy of History - that of Eairos.
Everything he says about the possibility or non-
possibility of an immutable natural law or about
the absoluteness of ethical contents is said in the light of
this concept of Kairos - the concept of the 'right moment'.
(I) ystematic Theology III, p 317.
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This introductary survey of the principal
philosophical themes in '-^'illich's Systematic Theology
has heen concerned with indicating the vastness and
complexity of his thought as a whole,. I have treated msny
important points in a summary way in order that
one may "be ahle to envisage the over-all framework in which
his moral philosophy is to be found.
More than that I have enphasised the many points of
contact that exist between his moral philosophy and
the metaphysical and psychological groundwork on which
it is builte These points of contact will be
p
reconsidered and fv^her elaborated , where it is
necessary^in the chapters that follow
It will be maintained that the signiificance and
originality of Tiiiichs ethical philosophy spring
directly from the framework in which his moral philosophy
is placed, Ho doubt it can be said of every ethical
philosopher of note that the anthropological and
metaphysical background to his ethics is vital to the
understanding of his thought - even where he may deny
that there is such a metaphysical background (l). With
Tillich it is doubly necessary as he himself intentionally
builds up his ethics in the light of the metaphysical
doctrines he haS already elaborated and one of his chief
concerns is that a complete consistency exist between the
two (2).
(1). This is particularly true of much of the ethical
discussions amoung contemporary exponents of Linguistic
Analysis, where they claim to prescind from metaphysical
cfljnsiderations. cf. GHARLES¥ORTH : Philosophy and
Linguistic "^alysis. p 185 -
Also Philosophical Studies XIII 5964 Article on Moore
by Daly.
(2) The entire theme of Tiiiichs book Love. Power and Justice-
centers on this point.
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Article III. The Place of Ethics in Tillicti's
Tho-ught»
In sketching the general themes of Tillich's philosophy
in the previous article, we have already implicitely
indi-wated the place of ethics in his thought as a whole.
However a more explicite treatment is needed of his
conception of moral philosophy and its relationship to
the rest of his thought. At first sight there would appear
to be a marked difference between his approach to moral
philosophy in Systematic Theology g,nd his approach to it
in some of his other works (l).
Taking his Systematic Thhology first^one sees how opposed
he is to any separate treatment of moral philosophy in this
works He thinks that in doing so one raises an insoluble
conflict between philosophical and theological ethics.
Such a conflict aTises he says when ethics is separated
from 'Dogmatics'. He is in favour of what he calls
'the present day neo- orthodox movement ' which rejects
such a separation.
"A theology which like the present system
eTfjsphasises the existential character of theology
must follow this trend (integration of ethics
with theology ) all the way to the very end."(2),
Por"t"illich the ethical element is a necessary -'and
often predominant ^ element in every theological
statement. Even such formal statements of the critical
principles, outlined in the first part of Systematic Theology
he regards, as pointing to the decision of the ethical
individual about his being or non-being. Likewise he
(I) The other work we have in mind here is principally
Love, Power and Justice, but Beyond Morality and
The Protestant Era convey the same impression.
Systematic Theology I» p 36.
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considers the doctrine of finitude and existence, of anxiety
and of guilt as not only ontological in character but also
ethical and in his consideration of the social and
personal dimensions of the individual^ he asserts that
the ethical element is predominan"^. -^illich gives
all these reasons or examples to indicate that exist
ential Theology (his Systematic Theology ) implies
ethics in such a way of its very nature that no
separate tbeatment of moral philosophy is necesarry or even
desirable
"Prom beginning to end ( of the Systematic Theology)
everything is ethical by implication" (l).
At first sight it would appear that ethics has
been swallowed up by Theology or that the notion of ethics
implicit^ in the above statements is very far from
the generally accepted ideas about this subject* If
one considers these statements,however , in the light of
the method of correlation, they appear less disconcerting.
By the use of this method he takes philosophical elements -
be they metaphysical, psychological or moral - into the
system itself, using them as the material out of which
questions are developed. Jhe questions arise oxir of a
philosophical analysis but they are answered by
theological concepts. Because of this method of treatment
one will not find an exclusive, self contained philosophical
section in Systematic Theology which is not directed in some
way to Theological doctrines®
In the case of ethics, there is another reason, as
the assertions above indicate, Tillich is using the word
Sthical'in these statements]' in what appears to be a very
loose sense® Jfliatever is a matter of unconditional or
theological concern is also a matter of ethical concern.
(I) Systematic Theology I» p 36
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But the whole of Systematic Theology is a matter of ultimate
concern, because it is the same theological concern that is
the driving force of every part of it - both philosophical
and theological. (I). Hence he can say of Systematic
Theology , not only that that every part of it is a matter
of ultimate concern but also that everything in it
is eve3?y%]aiHg ethical by implication, ^fhereever there is
ultimate concern the ethical dimension appears.
In his other -works, especially those which deal
with ethics, he gives a much more restic'ted meaning to
this adjective 'ethical' and its corresponding noun®
For instance in Love, Power and Justice, he defines ethics
in the following way;-
•^thics is the science of mans moral existence,
asking for the root of the moral imperative, the
criterion of its value, the source of its contents,
and the forces of its realization" (2),
^•••'his defininition would appear to correspond much better
to our traditional concept of moral philosophy as an
autonomous pcience, accessible to natural reason and
complet^y self contained.
Is there an opposition then between his
concept of ethics in his last and definite work Systematic
Theology and his conception of ethics in his other works ?
The fact that he wrote these latter works or rather two of
them at the same time gs he was engaged in writing the
1st and 2nd. volumes of Systematic Theology would appear to
militate against such a conclusion. It excludes an
explanation of the difference of approach in terms oS a
(1) Of. pp 29-30 on the relation between Unconditional
and theological
(2) Love,$£ower and Justice p 73»
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development of Ms thought. However this does not mean
that we have to try and explain the difference away.
It would appear to me that it signifies a definite
tension in ^iHich's thought which will come more to light
when we examine each of the key concepts of Tillich's
ethical philosophy in turn® "^illich seems to be trying
to reconcile the traditional Protestant attitude towards
ethical philosophy in which it is made ancillary to
scriptural or theological studafes and another tradition
or attitude in which it is treated as autonomous ^
philosophically and related, to metaphysics or other philosop
hical disciplines.
In what he says explicitely about ethics in Systematic
Theology (l) he is being faithful to the Reformers of
the I6th» century ib a certain extent and only to
a certain extent® They had rejected any source of morality
that is distinct from the Revealed word of God. Tillich
does not go so far. He opts for a compromised solution. It
is philosophy that proposes the ethical questions ; it is
Theology that provides the theological answers. At least
his starting points are philosophical whatever about
the nature of the definite solutions proposed.
The definition of ethics he gives in Love. Power and Justice
enphasises the tendency towards autonomy in TiiUchs
ethical philosophy - that is autonomy in the sense of
prescinding from theological considerations. Here again^
however , the ultimate solutions proposed invoke theological
considerations,
(I) I say 'explicitely'here because implicitely the
autonomous tendency in his thought appears in many
places.
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It is "because of these two tendenceis in his thought '
which he tries to harmonise-that one could say he lies
half-way "between the traditional Lutherian attitude
towards ethics in which it has no autonomy and the
Catholic attitude in which it is autonomous - that is as
a philosophical science. One consequence of this
borderline situation is that Tillich rejects any such
thing as a secular ethics (l). Both these tendencies
in Tillichs Ethical thought - that is towards philosophical
autonomy and towards theological dependence, are sujomed
up very succintly in. a definition of ethics he gives
in one of his earliest works, THE RELIG-IOUS SITUATION
" Ethics is the Question ahout activity (philosophical)
directed towards the Unconditional (theological ).(2)
The purpose of the rest of this dissertation will he
to examine in detail, how successful Tillich has "been,
in standing on this borderline between the Protestant and
Catholic attitudes towards ethical philosophy*.
(1) The chapter on Ethics and the Unconditional will
treat this point later
(2) The Religious Situation p 150
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CHAPTER III.
THB MORAL IMPERATIVE.
Introduction. In defining ethics as the science of
9iams moral existence, asking for the root
of the moral imperative, the criteria of
its validity and the forces of its realization (l), •^illich
indicates how essential to his thought this notion of the
moral imperative is. • Before considering however its
nature, source, criteria and^^force of its realization
we will examine the anthropological foundations in which
it is rooted. (ART. I. ). Jhen we will analyse the nature
of the moral imperative itself as outlined by "^'illich. His
treatment here is hoth negative and positive. He engages
first of all in a dialectical discussion with the findings
of other philosophers on this subject, accepting, rejecting
and, critiscising what they have to say. V/hile rejecting
everything that is defective and incomplete in their solutions
he is careful to point out^also^what is of value ( ART. II ).
More positively however his om solution is the direct
outcome of his own "basic ontological and anthropological
principles. !^his we will outline briefly , concentrating
on what he considers to be the immediate source of the
moral imperative in our experience ( ART. Ill ).
Finally we will deal with the 'limitations' and
ambiguities'(5f. this solution as "'"illich himself sees them,
despite the fact of having reached the conclusion that the
moral imperative did. contain an absolute factor. As we
shall see later one must go beyond morality itself to a
(I), Love. Power and Justice p 73
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solution that is 'trans-moral' in order to escape all
amlDiguity (ART. IV ).
.aaTIGLE I. MTHROPOLOGICAL FOmTOATIONS.
Tillich draws no sharp and clear-cut distinction "between
the moral imperative and the moral act in his works, -^he
moral imperative ^^the moral act and vica - versa.
Moreover the moral act does not "belong to a moral
dimensioned that is self enclosed and self contained, cut
off from the other- dimensions in man « "^he moral dimension
is intimately related to the other dimensions in man.
Thirdly the moral act could "be said to constitute the moral
dimension rather than presuppose it. It is the moral
act that establishes man as a spirit and in so doing^^it
"brings the spiritual dimension or the moral dimension in man
into being. (l).
To understand in any depth these statements necessitates
an examination of the anthropological foundations of the moral
imperative — that is an analysis of the multi
dimensional imity that is man and in particular the
spiritual dimension, of xfhich, the moral act is one
of the constituting factors (2). There is no doubt that
Tillichs moral philosophy has been determined to a great
extent by his anthropology. However in no place in his
works are the two explicitely coordinated, so that our
immediate task is to describe the chief points of contact.
(1) Of. Morality and Beyond p 20»
(2) We have already given an outline of what TiHich means
by the 'multi-dimensional unity of man'
Of. Chapter II pp 51-53.
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A. 0?h.e Uniqueness of the Spiritual Dimension. (I).
Tillich maintains that in his description of the
spiritual dimension in man —particularly its relationship
to the psychological dimension — he avoids any
dualist conception of man in any form. His concept of
'the mtilti-dimensional unity of man' is opposed not
only to Dualism ; it is also opposed to psychological
monism. It refutes
"a dualistic contrasting of the spiritual
with the psychological and also a dissolution of
the spiritual into the psychological, out of which
it arises (2).
Each encountered dimension of life shows a unique
structure, whether it concerns the inorganic, organic,
psychological or spiritual dimension, '^ hough each
dimension is established under flexable criteria one is
justified in speaking about a particular dimension if an
encountered reality posseses a unique structure. Por
instance in the inorganic dimension we encounter realities
with potentialities which become actual in time and space
and which are subject to physical analysis - that is subject
to causal relations which are measurable in terms of space
and time (3)® ^he organic dimension is characterised
by self-relating, self-preserving and self-constructing
wholese It is thg% last two dimensions that are of
special interest to us® '^he dimension
asatualises itself within another dimension — that of the
8f£S^iH§§v^®'feow does this take place ?
(I). In his description of the relation^of the psychological
to the spiritual dimension in man '-^'illich acknowledges
a certain dependence on Metzsche 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra
where he says the spirit is described as 'life cutting
into life '. W- TJi: p 29.
2) Systematic Theology III. p 29®
3) Ibid. p 19.
64.
Just as it is a constellation of conditions that makes
it possible for the organic dimension to appear in the
inorganic, the psychological dimension in the organic, so
also another constellations of conditions makes it possible
for the spiritual dimension to become actual in the
psychological, 'l^he crucial problem is how this
actualization of the spiritual dimension can follow from
this constellation of psychological factors, '-^illich
states that it is only when certain psychological
conditions are present that the leap takes place, which
brings about the domination of the spiritual dimension over
^he psychological, '^ 'he very fact that man can miss this
creative act constitutes for Tillich thes essence of the
moral problem (l)«,
It is in speaking about the multi-dimensional unity
of man , rather than in terms of body and soul, that he
hopes the safeguard the unity of the spiritual and
psychological elements in man and their complex relationship,
To speak of body and soul is for him not only to distort
the idea of the multi-dimensional unity of man ; it is also
to make incomprehensible the dynamism of the human
personality, Every act of the spirit presupposes given
psychological material, and at the same time constitutes
a leap which is possible only for a totally centred self.
This leap can be on the cognitive or moral plane. In
other words there is an interaction between the spiritual
(ft/ 2.
and psychological dimensionsM^man on both the cognitve and
moral levels. One throws light on the other®
(l) Systematic Theology III p 27.
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Knowledge presupposes the presence of different
material! — that of sense impressions, past experiences
as well as volitional and emotional elements. In order to
transform this material into knowledge something must he done
to it.
"It must be split, reduced, increased and
connected to logical criteria and purged according
to methodological material (l).
'-'-'his is done "by the personal centre, which is not identical
with any particular one of the constituting elementsj
It is the transcendence mf this centre over the psychological
material that makes the cognitive act possible and this act
is a mai^festation of the spiritual dimension in man.
On the other hand one cannot say that an additional element
has "been added to the psychological material. If it were
it would "be psychological material itself and not the
"bearer of the spirit according to Tillich. '-l^his does not
make the personal self foreign or strange to the
psychological material.
"It is THEIR psychological centre but transformed
• into the dimension of the spirit".
When the dimension of the spirit dominates, the psychological
centre offers the unity of its own contents to the unity
of the sprritual or personal centre, "^his happens through
deliberation and decision . It is in doing this th3,t
the psychological centre actualises its potentialities and
in actualising its potentialities it transcends itself
bringing the dmmension of the spiritual into being. (2)
A parallel process takes place in the moral act.
(1). Systematic Theology III p 28
(2) Ibid . p 28.
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Here also a large amoimt of material is present in the
psychological centre — drives,inclinations,desires etc..
But the moral act is not the diagonal in which all these
vectors limit each other and converge , It is the centred
self which actualises itself as a personal self •by-
distinguishing, separating, rejecting , preferring
connecting, and in so doing it transcends its elements (l).
It is this aspect of freedom — which is one of hall-marks of
the moral act — wfeiefe that makes possible the total reaction
of the centred self which deliberates and decides. (2).
One can see that this concept of a centred self is
at the heart of Tillichs distinction between the
psychological and spiritual dimensions in man, JurMiern^cRC
elucidation of this concept ^ provides valuable
anthropological background on ^-^^illich's conception of
moral good and moral evil.
Gentredness and self-Integration.
What is the specific kind of centredness that characterises
the moral dimension in man. -^or "^illich there is a
(1) Systematic Theology III. p 29.
(2) Though there is no reason for examining it closer at
this stage it is interesting to note that Tillich
links up this whole analysis of the moral act, with
the ontological polarity of Freedom and Destiny which
we referred to in the previous chapter. Of. p 45 - 46.
The Freedom present in the moral act is united with
Destiny in such a way.that the psychological material
that enters the moral act, represents the pole of
destiny, while the deliberating and deciding self
represents the pole of freedom
Gf, Systematic Theology III® p 29*
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centredness in all life . Basically this is because the
notion of centredness is hoimd up with the polarity of
individualization and participation which characterises
an being (l).. Centredness is a quality of
Individualization in that the indivisible thing is a
centred self. P\ fully individualised being is a fully
centred being and in man the quality of centredness is
unlimited (2).
In Tua.n this centredness is not something static. It is
a dynamic process of outgoing and returning. I'he most
individualised being is the most unapproachable anc^et at
the same time it has the greatest potentiality for
universal participation. Man can participate in the universe
in all its dimensions.
Only in man do we , or can we, find complete
^ centrednesse "^he act in which man actualises his essential
centredness is the moral act (3). Though not completly
idential with the spiritual dimension, morality for TUlich
is the constitutive function of the spiritual dimension (4).
Morality is seen primerally by Tillich as the act of
constituting this spiritual dimension — and n:ot as
obedience to some ^ivine or human law® ^iie moral act is
the act by which the spiritual dimension is actualised
or brought into being
Morality is the function of life , in which
the centred self, constitutes itself as a person;
It is the totality of those acts in which®
(1) This polarity we have also described in the last
chapter Of. pp 43-44®
(2) Systematic Theology III p 35
(3) Ibiido P 40.
(4) 'Not completly identical' because we have already seen
that the spiritual dimension is also characterised by
the activity of knowing. However Tillich often ignores^
this and treates the expressions 'spiritual dimension
and'moral dimension' as synonymous»
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a potentially personal life process iDecoines
an actual person " (l)
A unique type of centredness then is reached in the
moral act , one, which itself, constitutes the moral
dimension in man .
'Ihe centredness of the spiritual dimension , "by which
morality comes into existence is not something man is
"born with or something he acquires tout a fait at one
particular moment . J^is centredness is something
Tna.n actualises, and actualises repeatedly , in the course
of time . It is a a life long process.
" The constitution of the person as a person
never comes to an end during the whole life
process " (2).
One observation is called for at this stage. In his
manner of conceiving the moral act Tillich touches
upon one of the fundamental themes of the current of thought
known as Existential Phenomenologye It is that of the
historicity of man with all the consequences this idea
has in the Sphere of moral philosophy. Tillich too makes
roomj^^for the dynamic and creative element in the moral act.
There is a sense in which Tillich would admit to the
statement that 'Icreate morality'. However as we shall see
later this element of creativity is but one aspect of the
moral act. It is to thinkers such as Nedoncelle
and Madinier rather than Sartre that one should look
for parallels to the way '^'illich conceives the moral act (3)
(1). Systematic '-^heology III p 40
(2). P 40.(3). gEDGIJaBLLEiVers Une Phil, de L'Amour et dela Personne
Madinier ; La Conscience Morale.
In "both these books the dynamic and creative element
in morality are well to the fore, thought qualified.
T3-xmn -rmr JTVriJTirV:
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Gs Two Presuppositions of the Moral Set.
'-l-'illich conceives the moral act "by outlining two
presuppositions which s^^s underpin it.
Mans ability to transcend his environment and to "become
a totally centred self is the first presupposition of
morality according to ^^illich®
"Total centredness is the situation of
having face to face with oneself a world to which
one at the same time "belongs as a part " (l).
Because of his total centredness man is li"berated from
the "bondage of his environment which "binds every other
"being that exists,
" Man lives in an environment but unlike all
other beings he has at the same time a world" (2),
World in this context means for 'i-iiiich a "structured whole
of infinite potentialities' (5). In his encounter with his
enviroioBsnt man experience^oth his environment and his
world or rather it is in and through his encounter with
the things of his environment that man encounters a 'world'.
It is because man can transcend the merely environmental quality
,/ of the things he encounters that he is a completly centred
self® Otherwise in some part of his being he wouJLd
be part of his environment and this part would not be an
element in his centred self. However man can oppose himself
to every part of his world, 'including himself as part of
his world' (4), -^his distinction between having an
'environment' and having a 'world' is the essence of the
first presupposition of morality.
(1). Systematic Theology III p 4I9
(2). Ibid. p 41.
(3), Ibid. p 41.
(4). Ibid. p 41.
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The second! presupposition follows from the first.
Because man has a world which he faces as a totally-
centred self, he can ask questions and receive answers and
commands (I). This is a unique characteristic of the
spiritual dimension. It implies not only freedom from
ones environment ;, it also implies norms which determine the
moral act through freedom, '-^his presupposition of "being
able to aSk questions and receive commands , implied in our
freedom from environment is so central to his thought
that we will quote the passage in full where he describes
it.
" These norms (or commands^ express the essential
structure of reality, of self and of world, over
against the existential conditions of mere environment.
It becomes man&fest that freedom is openness to norms
of unconditional or essential validity® They express
the essence of being and the moral sidte of the function
of self-integration is the totality of acts in which
the commands coming from the essence of the
encountered world are obeyed or disobeyed* " (2)
It is because of this dual relationship to environment
—belonging to it anc^et at the same time separated from it
and thus having a world — that man can f^irst of all;,
0 receive commands and^ secondly^ can obey or disobey them.
He is free to obey or to disobey the moral demand.
Here again there are points of contact between Tillichs
analysis of the presuppositions of morality and the
phenomenology of freedom as outlined for instance by
Luijpen in his work EXISTF|fTIAL PHBNOMONOLOGY (3)» though
the terminology is different® Luijpen speaks about this
freedom in man as 'Distance', as'having to be' as 'project'
and as for Tillich 'to be free is to be ethical' (4).
In both there is the opposition between a personalist
conception of man and a legalist conception of being ethical.
(I) Systematic Theology III p 41
(P) Ibid« p 41
(5) Even the title heading of Chapter 4. which we have in
mind here, reminds one of Tillich. 'Phen pf " '^reedom & Desti
(4) EXISTENTIAL PHENOMONOLOCtY ; p 281.
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The way "both luijpen and Tillich describe the
presuppositions of morality is a refusal to suhstttute
a process-like acting according to the law, for the
creative aspect of moral life. J^'inally the fact that freedom
implies norms is also common to both. (l),
•^he fact that one finds so many points of contact
in Tillichs work with present day existential phenomonology
does not indicate that he is in direct contact with
this movement. It points to the fact that Tillich too has
drawn from the same sources Husserl and Heidegger. As
we shall see later it is to German Idealists - Eant, Hegel
V»
and '^celling - that Tillich acknowledges ^in the first place^
as sources of his thought® '-^he difference between
Tillich and certain exponenets of existential phenomonology
such as ^artre and Merleau-Ponty lies in the fact that with
Tillich the Idealisi^ sources of his thought are
acknowledged ; with S®rtre and Merleau -Ponty they are
rejected or denied® As Dondeyne points out this is where
they may be deceiving themselves (2),
D., The Anti-Moral Act..
Consideration of what TiHich refers to as the anti-moral
act can throw further light on his conception of the
moral act» The anti-moral act is one in which sJD. individual
gives way to the forces of disintegration, '^ 'he moral act
is one in which the harmonisation and integration of these
same forces is achieved® In the anti-moral act man
surrenders to the forces of disintegration. In the moral act
(1) Existential Phenomonology ; "Mans being is not a being
necessitated, but a being-free that is a being-oblidged'"''
Cfo p 287.
(2) Contemporary Europian Thought and Christian Faith p III-
113.
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he dominates these forces^ '•'•^o understand what Tillich
means "by disintegration 4# the moral dimension it is worth
while seeing what he means "by this concept on other
dimensions. (I).
In all dimensions disintegration is the failure to
reach or to preserve self-integration. It can be due to
either of two things — the inability to go out from
oneself and to overcome a limited, stabilised and
immovable centredness, or the inability to return to,
recover, or stabilise ones centred self, ^t the organic
or biological dimensions ,health and disease can be defined
in terms of these integrating or disintegrating forces.
Elements , foreign to the organism, but which must be
assimiliated, have the dendency to become independent,
within the centred whole and to disrupt it. On the other
hand self restriction of the centred whole in which the
organism tries to remain in a static self identity, can
also lead to disintegration and disease. (2)
The self integration of life in the psychological
dimension, also follows this basis outwards and inward movement.
Here the movement is on the level of self-awareness, -^'here
are forces driving outwards towards self-alteration, or
inwards towards self-identity (3)® On the one hand the
psychological self can be disrupted by its inability
to assimiliate. It can also be disrupted by its inability
to resist the destructive impact of pressures drawing the
self in too many different directions or in failing to
keep particular psychological functions balanced by others.
The moral and anti-moral act are analogous to. the
(1). Systematic Theology III p 37®
(2), Ibid. p 37.
(3)» Ibid, p 39.
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integrating and disintegrating forces , working at the
above levels or dimensio^is. I-lan can surrender to the
disintegrating forces which tend to control his
personal centre or he can dominate them and achieve
integration "by obeying the moral commands coming to him from
the centre of his being. What happens when man does
not obey ? What happens in the anti-moral act ? What
are the characteristics of the anti-moral act
which distinguish it from disintegration at the
organic and psychological dimensions ? gven in his
anti-moral acts man constitutes himself as a completly
centred self®
"Man acts against the spirit in the power of the
-Spirit" (I).
Anti-moral acts express moral centredness even when they tend
to disolve the moral centre. -Jhe anti-moral act is not
seen primerally as a transgression of a I^ivine or human
law® It is an act which impedes the realization of
the person as a person In Morality and Beyond he describes
this in some detail
"The anti-moral act is not the transgression of one
or several prescribed commands. It is an act that
contradicts the self-realisation of the person as
a person. It drives towards disintegration.
It disrupts the centredness of the ,person by
giving predominance to partial trends, passions,
desires, fears, and anxieties® '-^^he central .
control is weakened, often almost removed, -^he
self is split and the conflicting trends make it
their battlefield, .-^'reedom is replaced by
compulsion.. .'- '^he voice of mans essential being
is silenced step by step "(9!).
The depersonalization of man is the first consequence of
the anti-moral act that Tillich envisages. This is the
essence of the anti-moral act. ''%ereas the moral act is
(1) Systematic l^heology III p 42.
(2) Morality and Beyond p 20e
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always a victory over disintegrating forces j the aaii-
anti-moral act is defeat in the face of these same forces,.
Tillich has incorporated psychological findings about
the existence of the unconcscious and the dynamic nature
of man into his anthropology which have influenced the
way he conceives the moral and anti-moral act. (l).
Conclusion. In examining the anthropological foundations
of the moral act or moral imperative, we
had to describe its^lace in the spiritual
dimension of man and the intimate relationship of
this d&nsion to the psychological. )|e also saw
how the notion of centredness or integration runs
through all the dimensions in man culminating in mans
total centredness. '•^hen we considered two important
presuppositions of the moral imperative — the distinction
between mans environment and his'world' leading to
freedom and the fact that this freedom implies norms.
Lastly we examined •^illichs concepts of good and evil in
describing what he means b)y the moral and anti-moral act «
These he describes in terras of personalising and
depersonalising forces , integrating and disintegrating
forces or rather the domination 'pr submission to^ these .
0^ y
forces®
However we have not yet come to grips with our
main problem — the nature and source of the moral imperative.
"e did touch upon the important statement that the essential
aspect of the moral act is'its openness to norms of
unconditional validity' and that 'morality in the first place
is the expression of the moral imperative
(l). We have already pointed out was deeply interested
in the works of Preud as early as 1920 - Of Chapter I
p.IX and that later in the United States he came into
contact with the psychoanalytic movement there C.f p^O'^ X
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These statements do not tell vis very much, however
ahout the sources, the nature , or the content of the
moral imperative or how we become imm|:ediatly aware of it,
In presenting Tillichs anthropological foundation to the
moral imperative we have laid the groundwork of his
responce to these problems®
ARTICLE 11$. Defective or Inadequate Solutions
to the source and nature
of the Moral Imperative.
Introduction. Before examining Tillich's own solution
to the question of the nature and immediate
source of the moral imperative in our
experffiffince, we will review first of all his attitude to other
solutions, indicating what he rejects or critiscises in
them, and also what he retains as of value in each of them.
It is in a continual dialectic with the solutions of other
philosophers that TilUch determines his own position. In
no case is it a matter of total rejection. He carefully
points out the element of truth in each solution he rejects
or criticisffis. (l).
(l). There are three places in Tillichs works where he
is concerned with the nature and source of the moral
imperative Morality and Beyond pp 13-47,
liove. Power and Justice pp 72-82. and Systematic
Theology III pp 47-53. There is a good deal of
overlapping in the three places. However in the latter
work there is a more condensed and S3mthetic treatment
of the nature and source of the moral imperative and
the distinction between an ultimate source and an
immediate source becomes more apparent thought Tillich
in no place explicitely makes this distinction. This
slight Svolution in the manner of approach ^ten years
after the appearence of the first two books does not
justify us in speaking of a development of nis thought
in the intervening time.
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One should keep in mind also that in each of the
solutions Tillich examines, the problematic, no more than
the solutions proposed is continually changing. At one
moment '^illich is examining a solution proposed as the
ontological foundation of the moral imperative, at another
fhe theological presuppositions, at another the psychological
processes that accompany the moral act or precede it or
lastly what he refers to as the moral aim of the moral
imperative. Moreover in his attitude to these solutions
he no where makes explicits when he is referring to an
immediate source of the moral imperative and when he is
referring to an ultimate source. His resulting critique
then gives a certain kaleidoscopic effect to his views.
After outlining these we will return in the next article
to a more precise and positive treatment of Tillich's
views,
I® The Pragmatic Solution.
Tillich refers to the proponents of this solution as
adherents of the 'Philosophy of Life'. He has in mind
Bergson but Dilthey, James and Dewey,
According to Tmich they advocate that ethical norms
or the moral imperative is the ' objectivation of hunian
experience*(I), Life then is its own criteria.
In so far as this solution maintains that the norms of life
do not originate outside life Tillich agrees with it. It
is consistent with Tillich's doctrine of the multi
dimensional unity of life and his rejection of different
levels. For Tillich too the norms or criteria of life are
(l) Eove, Power and Justice p 73
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immanent in life itself •.
The pragmatic solution however fails in Tillic"s eyes
in that it does not and cannot , according to its "basic
metaphysical principles, transcend life in order to judge
life. It cannot explain how particular expressions of life
can "become norms for life as a whole. It cannot indicate
how one can escape complete and total relativism in
ethics, no more than how it can indicate how one can
escape relativism in other spheres® lillich points out,
however , that is is never faithful to its "basic assumption
"Wherever the pragmatic method is applied
consistently to ethical, political or aesthetic
Judgements, it selects criteria which themselves
must "be measured by higher gnd finally highest
criteria, and when this point is reached, the
pragmatic method is replaced, without explicits
recognition, by an ontological principle which
cannot be tested pragmatically, because it is the
criterian of all testing. Pragmatism cannot get
away from some transcending factor in ethics" (l).
•'•he transcending factor appears somewhere and what
Tillich has in mind is the moral imperative. It is never
acknowledged® It tries to explain away the moral imperative
but ends up by presupposing it.
2. The Solution of the Philosophy of Values.
When one speaks of the Philosophy of Valuetoday,
it is Scheler, Lavelle and certain Existentialist
philffisophers that come to mind. Tillich uses
expression in a technical sense referring^not to these/^but
to 19th century philosophers such as Lotze, Ritschl and in all
likelihood Nietzsche (2).
(1) Systematic Theology III pp 29-30
(2) In three places in his works Tillich deals with this
solution : Morality and Beyond p 25 t Love, Power and
Justice p 73 and the place referred to above in
Systematic Theology III
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S^his solution he regards as one of the most
important attempts to make ethics independent of Ontology.
Because of the breakdown of classical German Idealism —
especially that of the Hegelain system the interpretation
of man was delivered into the hands of a mechanistic science
and a materialist ontologjy^. Ethics then became the property
of psychology and sociology, ^very 'ought to be' w§.s
transformed into an 'is', every norm into a fact, ^he only
way left open to defend the validity of ethical norms was
by a philosophy of values, where valuesjpractical and theor-
e-^cal-ywere given an independent foundation of their own®
They were made independent of the order of being so
g-vodding the attacks of materialist and naturalist philosophers.
(I).
The great merit of the solution proposed by the
Philosophy of values , according to Tillich was that it
tried to establish the validity of norms, without taking
refuge in heteronomous theology on the one hand or in the
absolutist metaphysics of Hegel on the otherhand , which
was in the process of disintegrating.
"They wanted to save the vaMity of ethical norms,
without appealing to pragmatic relativism or
metaphysical absolutism" (2),
So they tried to establish iSorms in values themselves. The
moral imperative is now rooted in each value , independently
of the others. Consequently there is no basic unified source
of the 'oTOght to be'^ The value of the / 'Holy' may
crown the hierarchy of values or it may not. The other values
(1) Love. Power and Justice, p 73
(2) Systematic Theology III p 30
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can subsist without it® In a.ny case if it is there it takes
its place in the hierarchy of values independently of the
others, '^'he values in the hierarchy lie above and below
one another without their being any immanent relationship
between one or another. Consequently the removal of one
does not entail the removal of aether .
As 2^illich's moral philosophy is characterised by its
attempt to establish a relationship between ethics and
ontology he is radically oppossd to such a solution. If
there is no ontological participation of values in existence
but only an unbridgeable gap between the two^how can
a command coming from beyond existence have any bearing
on existence ? What is the basis for the claim that such
values have a relevence to life ?. Its root failure in
Tillich's eyes is that
"At no instance does the Philosophy of Values
show the relationship of obligation to being" (l).
Hence it cannot show how any particular value can
involve obligations for existing beings.
Furthermore Tillich demands how values can become
valid of their very nature if they always presuppose an
evaluating subject. How can such a'bsolute values be
discovered ? How can they be related to reality. '-I^he
Philosophy of Values provides no solution to the source
of the'ought to be because it has diverced ethics from
ontology. It has cut itself off from a Philosophy of being
which alone - in ^illich's eyes — can provide an adequate
(I). Systematic Theology III. p 30,
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solvitioia to the soiirce of the moral imperative.
"Values have reality only if they are rooted in
reality. Their reality is the expression of their
ontological foundation" (l).
3, 'The Will of G-od' as Source of the Moral Imperative.
To assert that the will of God is the source of the moral
imperative is to assert its intrinsically religious character.
This can be \mderstood in a certain way which is completly
un-accej^^table to •'•illich.
"Theology can str^ongly affirm the uncondit-onal charact
er of the moral imperative, but deny that this
^ character makes it relggious;. Moral commands one argues
then, are religious because they are Divine commandments.
This alone makes them unconditmonal. God could have
willed otherwise. (l).
^uch an argument to Tiilich's mind would exclude any kind
of secular ethics. Not only the content but also the
unconditional character of the moral imperative would have
to be sanctioned by a Divine commandment. (2).
Tillich completly rejects such an interpretation of the
expression 'the will of God' as source of the moral imperative.
It is not an external will imposed on us from outside.
If the expression means an arbitrary law that is strange to
our essential nature it cannot be said to be the source of the
moral imperative in any acceptable sense. On the other hand
if it signifies our potential being, with all its
potentialities as derived from G-od , it is acceptable to
Tillich and in this sense can be said to be the source of
the moral imperative. He is adament in maintaining that the
(1) Morality and Beyond p 23
(2) Tillichs attitude to 'secular' ethics is somewhat
ambivalent as will be seen later in the chapter on
ethics and the existence of ^od.
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moral imperative does not imply a strange law external and
foreign to our nature "but that it coincides with the 'silent
voice of our own nature as man' and as man with an
individual charac t er. (I).
4;„ The Psychological and Sociological Solution.
Here Tillich is confronting the claim of Psychologists
and Sociologists, of the past hun[0rred years^with a deterministic
frame of mind^who try to explain away the moral imperative.
They maintain that consciousness of a moral imperative is
a matter of feeling — a feeling of something
unconditionally serious, ^"dded to this is the presupposition
of sociologists that we can account for the presence of a
moral imperative in the mass of people "by the different
pressures exercised "by ruling groups, using various tools
of suppression — military, legal, educational, and
psychological.
"Prom generation to generation, this pressure
produced an increasing internationalization of
commands, namely the sense of standing under
an inner unconditional command, an absolute moral
imperative" (2).
]ije have already anticipated Tillichs responfe to this
solution in the way he describes the spiritual and psychological
dimensions in man. '•'•'he above solution ignores the spiritual
dimension or reduces it totally to the psychological.
Por '-^illich a delicate balance must be maintained between
the two dimensions^ such that the moral act can be said
to arise out of a constellation of factors without being
reducable to them (5). the moral actpwhich is the response
(1) Morality and Beyond p 24
(2) Ibid. p 26
(5) Cf. Systematic Theology III p 28 and above p 65-66
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to the moral imperative-a large amoimt of psychological
material is present to the centre but as we said earlier
the moral act is not the diagonal in which these different
factors converge. The moral act is the centred self
actualising itself, in face of the psychological material
presented to it. Once one has established the existence
of the spiritual dimension in man one has to reject the solution
of the psychologists who explain the moral imperative away.,
2?he reason this solution appears attractive is that
it presupposes what it tries to prove — the identity of
two qualitively different structures, 'i-'here is no denying
the presence of psychological factors in the moral act or
what '-^illich refers to as psychological causaiion. But within
this structure of causation another is manifest according to
Tillich , the 'structure of meaning'or of 'intentionality*
This structure is evident in the case where a mathematician
discovers a new mathsmiatical proposition. Jhe validity of
the proposition is independent of the series.of
conditions which make the discovery possible® In a similiar
way the moral imperative or 'ought to be' appears within
the psychological and sociological processes which make
its appearence possible. It"'s validity is not dependent
however din the structure in which it appears. Psychological
and social pressures may provide and do provide the occasion
for the appearence of the moral imperative . They cannot
produce or explain the meaning of the uncondit^nal (l).
Tillich's reasoning is as fol]^^s
"However strong the pressures be they are
themselves conditional and it is possible to
contradict them and be liberated from them, as
for example from the father image or from the
socially produced conscience. This is not
possible in regard to the \mconditional character
of the moral imperative One can of course
(I). Morality and Beyond p 27.
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disregard every particular content for the sake of
another l)ut one cannot disregard the moral
imperative itself without the self-destruction of
one's essential nature" (l).
¥e saw earlier the deadening effect the anti-moral act
progressively has on the moral centre in man. Where
moral disintegration sets in the freedom of the centred self
can be gradually replaced "by purely compulsive "behaviour.
In a sense this is the only way one can "be liberated from
the unconditional commands of the moral imperative. But
what one is left with is not liberty but servitude. For
Tillich the moral imperative is part of our essential nature.
5® Incomplete Solutions.
According to Tillich the solutions proposed as to the
nature and source of the moral imperative vary according
to the moral aim of each particular ethical philosophy, ^^gain
the problematic has changed somewhat. What one decides is
mans intrinsic aim or ^telos'will determine your conception
of the moral imperative. If the moral aim implies something
above finitude and transitoriness it will possess a
moral imperative which is uncondi"fe.onal mn nature. On the
other hand if the moral aim consists in the greatest
amount of pleasure to be attained in this life, as is the
case with Hedonist Philosophy, then no unconditional moral
imperative can be said to be present (2). '-inhere is just the
conditional advice to calculate well.
There are many intermediate solutions between these two poles
which formulate a finite moral aim but where an unconditional
element in regard to the moral imperative breaks through.
(1) Morality and Beyond p 27
(2) Ibid. p 28
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Because Utilitarianism demands the greatest happiness for
the greatest number, it neccessitates a certain self
restraint on the part of each individual and consequently
an unconditional element appears.
"A demand appears which cannot "be derived from
the merely natural trends of the individual, a
demand which implies the acceptance of the other
person as a person (I).
For Bpicurianism happiness consists in'the life of the spirit
in community with friends'. This demands unconditional
subjection to the norms and structures of 'friendship,
knowledge and "beauty*. In^ristotles eudonomistic ethics
an unconditional element also appears. Mans highest aim is
participation in the eternal Divine self-intuition.
"To reach this goal is an unconditional
imperative" . -^nd since the practical virtues
are the precondit i.onalj for fulfillment through
participation in the Divine, they also have
unconditional validity. " (2)
Only in Hedonism according to Tillich is the
unconditional or absolute element of transcendence
denied. Only then is man totally imprisoned in his
finitude (3). Al3^ other ethical philosophies introduce
a moral imperq.tive in some form or another and
consequenibly some dimension of the unconditional, 'i'he fact
that other elements such as happiness, eudonism, emotional
awareness of fulfillment etc, are also present does not
exclude the presence of a moral imperative ,
However all these ethical philosophies are defective
or incomplete in that they associate the unconditional moral
(1) Morality and Beyond p 28-29
(2) Ibid. p 29
(3) Ibid, p 50.
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with the wrong ethical content, For Tillich the "basic
moral aim is'to become a person in a community of persons'
It could be described as the 'primitive fact' of "i^illich's
ethical philosophy, " '^he recognition of the inalienable
dignity of the human person is the primordial significant
datum of Tillichs moral philosophy. (l)
ARTICLE III» TILLICH'S SOLUTIOIT.
As was remarked earlier , it is in a dialectical
discussion with the solutions just examined in regard
to the ontological, theological, psychological and moral
aspects of the moral imperative, that Tillich takes up
his own position, 4 summary of the positive elements
of his position in face of these other philosophies will
indicate where his sympathies lie®
• '^hough wrong in reducing the moral imperative
to a particular life process, the Pragmatic "olution was
right in maintaining that the moral imperative or the
norms of morality have a direct bearing on life itself. The
Philosophy of Values x^as justified in searching for a
solution that avoids pragmatic relativism and metaphysical but
wrong in thinking that this leads to the separation of
ethics and metaphysics, -"-ccording to ^^illich one can
synthesise the positive ^^ments in these two solutions
and avoid their errors by regarding "the essential nature
(I). Me arising-this expression 'primitive fact4 in the
sense outlined by Professor Dondeyne in his book.
Contemporary Europian '-thought and Christian Faith p 25-27.
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of man or of being , 'the logus determined structure of
reality", as the source of the moral imperative. The
essential or essential thing in man , which is the source
of the moral imperative, is the fact that he is
potentially a person in a community of persons, For
Tillich this has a metaphysical foimdation in reality
itself (I), '"e have already seen how the moral act^by
which the spiritual dimension comes into being,
presupposes the freedom to receive commands, the freedom
to obey or disobey them.
"The source of these commands is the essential
structure of encountered reality, in man himself
and in his world." (2)
The essential nature of man — and not his estranged
existential nature as the Pragmatic solution conoid have it,
or independent values, isolated from their ont©logical
foimdation as the adherents of the Philosophy of values
propose is the source of the moral imperative, Tmichs
basic distinction between mans essential nature and his
estranged existential state/^, It is only because such
a distinction exists that man is confronted with a moral
imperative in the very first place. To fulfill ones
essential being is the basic moral command.
One observation is called for at this stage. Despite
the affinities he claims his moral philosophy has to that
of ICant, it will be apparant from what has been said above j
that he is much more closer to Aquinas than to Eant in
regard to the metaphysical basis of the moral imperative.
It was because Kant had eliminated metaphysics that he
tried to make the moral imperative self-subsisting and hence
(1). Systematic Theology III p 42
(2) " Ibid. p 42.
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a categorical moral imperative® TflHiat IJillich is saying is
that you necessarilly seek this end, conforming jovr
actions to your essential nature, because you are what you
are. Because it is in this sense that the moral imperative
is absolute and unconditional Tillich here comes much closer
to St, Thomas Aquinas than to Kant. In fact Kant would
have called this imperative of Tillich's not a categorical
moral imperative "but an gen assertoric hypothetical
imperative. However Tillich no more than St. Thomas Aquinas
seems to "be convinced that though the moral imperative
is in a real sense unconditional and absolute, a rational
analysis can be given^it 'j—as above-^hich indicates its{N / \
metaphysical foundation in reality, (Ij.
1/hen examining the 'Will of G-od' as the source of
the moral imperative, the problematic has evolved one stage
further® Here Tillich is concerned with the
•theological aspect' of the moral imperative. Conceived
in any heteronomous fashion, the will of God cannot be said
to be the source of the moral imperative. However if
the will of God is connected.with ou± essential being
confronting us with all its potentialities it too can be
said to be the source of the moral imperative. (2)
The problematic has again shifted when we are
examining the psychological and sociological solution. Here
it is not a question of denying the psychological factors
•underlying the moral imperative but of giving them their
lawful but limited position in relation to the spiritual
(1). P.C.Coplestons AQUINAS ) pp 216 - 217.
(2). The relation of morality to the existence of God
will be examined in a later chapter.
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The iTTiTnediate source of the Moral Imperative.
As we indicated earlier (l) Tillich himself does not
make the distinction "between an immediate source and an
ultimate source of the moral imperative. Because such
a distinction is impliciti^ in his latter work -Seystematic
Theology — we feel jusitified in using it. For Tillich
however , one of the reasons why he did not make such a
distinction is probably because the two are:quasi-identical.
What he takes to be the •ultimate source and the immediate
source of the moral imperative constitute the primitive
fact of his moral philosophy and that^because there is such
a close connection between ethics and metaphysics in his
thought (2). Granted that the ultimate source of the
moral imperative is being itself, this central intuition
has its immediate source in our immediate experience or
rather mn one particular meaningful moment of our
experience»
In affirming that the answer to the question of the
immediate source of the moral imperative has been provided
with increasing unanimity in contemporary ethical
discussions on the basis of Protestant and Kantian insights,
he asserts
"The immediate source of the moral imperative
is in the encoimter of a person, who is already
and not yet a person, with another in the same
condition, in which both are constituted as real
persons" (3).
The experimental root of morality then - the immediate
(1) Gf Footnote (l) p 75.
(2) This will become more evident later when we examine
his metaphysical analysis of the concepts Love, Power
and justice.
(3) Systematic Theology III. p42
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source is the person to person encounter^ In this very-
encounter, the dimension of the spirit or the moral
dimension is constituted.
"The moral imperative is the command to become
what one potentially is, — a person within a
community of persons." (I)
It iSj^in the person to person encoimter^ that the moral
dimension is consituted. It is the beginning and the end
the source and the goal of the moral imperative.
One remark is called for at this point® There is no doubt
that the moral philosophy of Kant has exercised an influence
on contemporary moral philosophy but it is an influence
that is difficult to estimate (2)® Without a doubt there
are a certain number of general intuitions,extremely
new, in Kants ethics and the one Tillich is probably thinking
of here is Kant's formulation or rather one of his
formulations of the. Categorical Imperative. "So act as to
treat humanity, whether in youj? own person, or in that
of any other, always at the same time as an end and never
as a means"(3). It is true that Kant could be said to be
a point of departure for the important place given
to the person to person encounter in contemporary ethical
philosophy but one shoiild not forget however that the
whole trend in Kants ethical philosophy lay in another
direction® - The remark of Lacroix in this contest seems to me
(1). Morality and Beyond p 19.
(2). Gf. LERLERCQ :Les G-randes Lignes de la Phil. Morale. P 154
(3). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
Cfe also the Introduction of Delbos to the
french edition of the same work : Fondements de la
Metaphysique des moeurs ( Delagra^ve) P45 46.
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appropriate,
"Fa^ndamentally value with. Kant is not on the side of
the person hut on the side of the law, or rather
the person is of value in so far as he can be "but at
the service of the law; he has not his own proper
value. If there is something of a personalist
in Kant it is destroyed "by that which is of the
legalist in him" (l)
To return to Tillich's exposition of the immediate source
of the moral imperative one could ask 'Why is it that the
moral imperative is expressed primerally in the person to
person encounter ?
The reason lies in the difference
between an encounter of one person with another and the
encounter "between a person and a non-personal reality.
Man in his encounter with non-personal realities is set no
limit in the way he can deal with them. He can treat them
as objects ; he can dissect them, analyse them, construct
something new out of them. Because man can transcend himself
in all directions, he|3an use all non personal realities
for his own purposes{2)ln facing the world, man has the
whole universe as the potential content of his centred
self, ^ertainly there are actual limits, '^illich
acknowledges, because of the finitude of every being but
the world he says is indefinitely open to man and can
become a content of the self-0J
"Uobody can say where the final limits of human
power lie.. In his encounter with the universe
man is able to transcend every imaginable limit"(3).
(1) Personne et -^mour.Paris 1955. — p 40-41.
Quoted in Luijpen: Existential Phenoomonology p 281
(2) Theology andCulture p 78
(3) Systematic Theology III p 42e
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^here is however one limit to mans tendency to draw all
things into himself and to treat them as ohgiects — this
is the other self, the other person.
"One can subject and exploit another in his organic
basis, including his psychological self "but
not the other self in the dimension of the spirit.
One can destroy the other as a self "but one
cannot assimiliate him as a content of ones own
centredness.... Nobody can deprive a person of
his claim^ to be a person and to be treated as a
person® •'•herefore the other self is the
unconditional limit to the desire to
assimiliate ones whole world and the experience
of this limit is the experience of the 'ought to be'
(I).
It is in respecting this unconditional limit in the
encounter vfith the other person that the moral dimension in
man is constituted. It begins and grows and developes with
this experience.
"Personal emerges in the encounter of
person with person and in no other way" (2)
An isolated being with the psycho-somatic structure of man
could never actualise the g) iritual dimension that
is potential in him. And even when it is actualised ,
continual encounters with other people ase necessary if
the self-integration of the person is to be maintained and
progressively perfected, "^here is mutual selfiintegration
in these mutual enxjounters.
The opposite is also true® He who refuses to respect
the unconditional limit in the person to person encounter
who refuses the intrinsic claim of the other person to
be treated as such, destroys himself as much as he destroys
B
(1) Systematic '-^'heology III p 43
(2) Ibid. p 43.
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the other person. 'In destroying the other he fiestsoys
himself, '- '^he resistence he meets with in the other person
forces him or compels him to treat the other as a person or
to give up his o>m 'person' quality (l).
"The master who treats the sla^re not as a person
but as a thing, endangers his own quality as a
person^ The slave by his very existence hurts
the master as much as he is hurt by him (2).
The influence here of Hegel is imdeniable (3). Tillich
does not deny this ^ However he attributes the importance
of the person to person encounter in his thought not to
Hegel but to Ifertin Buber. It was Buber,he points out,that
distinguished the'I'-'thou' from the 'I'-'it' relationship
before the existentialists got to work on this theme
"Long before the recent existential[thinking
appeared Buber had asked and answered these
questions (how to become an I and not an 'it' ;
how to become a person and not a thing) on the
basis and by the power of prophetic religion. There
is no other way of becoming an 'I' than by meeting
a 'Thou' .. and there is no way of meeting a 'thouS,
than by meeting and accepting the 'eternalThou'
in the finite 'Thou'. (4)
In his final work Systematic Theology Tillich adds a point
that did not appear in his earlier expositions of the
central place of the person to person encounter in his
philosophy. He remarks that if man did not run up against
this resistence in the other person, he would try to make
himself absolute. 'Jlie resistence of the other self is
unconditional and because it is so man is not absolute
in himself . More than likely it is Sartre he has in mind
(1) Morality and Beyond p 78
(2) Ibid. p 78
(5) Of. La Phenomenologie de LSSsprit i Translation of Hyypolite,
pp I6I-I66. ^
(4) Theology and '-'ulture p 189.
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in this last remark s
vjHiCU
It is en this unconditional element ^t-hat appears
in ones encounter with other persons that TiHich takes
as the source of the uncondit\Dnal element in the moral
imperative and to which the (E^ment of command in every
moral situation can he reduced. If man does not want to
destroy the other person as a person and if he does not
want to destory himself as a person he must enter into
communion with the other, '-^he acknowledgement of the existence
of this necessity is the ackowledgement of the existence of
the moral imperative in the person to person encounter.
Does Tillichs ethical philosophy merit the title of
a personalist philosophy in virtue of his analysis of
the immediate source of the moral imperative as outlined
above. It would he premature at this stage to answer such
• •
a question. J'^ e have yet to deal with his concepts of law and
love. In comparison with such philosophers as Uedoncelle,
Madinier and Lacroix it could be noted that he leans
towards a negative type of personalism in which the notion
of resistence, strife and command come much to the fore.
This may he becajise he has taken the moral imperative to
be at the core of ethical philosophy rather than in
subordinatffion to more primitive notione such as the good .
He is right in thinking that Kant and the Protestant
religion have influenced his ethical philosophy. Kantian
formalism and the protestant anphasis on duty, so aligned
to it, are so central to moral philosophy in Tillich's
eyes that he can only escape them by going beyond the
moral sphere altogehter.
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ARTICLE IV. lilMITATIOITS AED iymiGUITIES OF
THE MORAL 1^0.^7
It would appear , at first sight, that '-^illich has reached
in the person to person encounter, a bedrock foimdation
for the unconditional character of the moral imperative.
This is not so. He himself is the first to add that the
last word has not heen said ahout it. In facts- he adds
a series of qualifications to his own solutia^, which
indicate the limitations and ambiguities that still
remain attached to this starting point of his moral
philosophy in the person to person encounter .
LIMITATIONS.
Tillich first of all points out that the person to person
encounter is not a complete or total explanation of the
origin and source of the moral imperative® Granted that to
fulfill ones nature as a human person is a moral demand
evidenced in the person to person encounter, one can still
ask^he says^why one has to fulfill this demand, Ha,ve I
not the right to leave my potentialities unfulfilled. Can
I not remain less a person even if that involves that others
are also so restricted«? *%y cannot I not restiict my
own essential goodness and even that of others ? If I have
a right to these possibilities it would follow that
the moral imperative is unconditional only if I choose
to affirm my ovm essential nature and this he says would
in a sense be to make the moral imperative conditional.
Though he does not acknowledge it explicitely ^what ^illich
falls back on are Kants postulates of the practical reason
to bu-fress the moral imperative®
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Though the encounter with other persons is the immediate
source of the moral imperative and puts in evidence that the
moral imperative is our own essential nature confronting us
in the form of commands, we have to go "beyond it, that
is to a trans-moral realm in orsier to find its ultimate
vindication, are concerned then with the religious
quality of the moral imperative . The ultimate reason
why one must fulfill ones spiritual nature rather than
destroy it is because in the person to person encounter
we somehow become aware that our ^Mi^beings are of
infinite value and they can somehow share in the Divine life
He appeals to the immortality of the human being and the
existence of ^od , not as philosophical postulates
as Kant does , to buttress the moral imperative but as
answers provided by theology to the philosophical question
of the nature and source of the moral imperative. It will
be sufficient to say at this point that our experience of the
moral imperative puts us into some kind of contact
'transcendent union with a spiritual presence'7-which calls
for the fullfilment of the moral imperative. (I)., The
fact that one must eventually appeal to Theology , for
the answer to a philosophical problem about the.
source of the moral imperative is in accordance with
Tillichs method of correlation. It indicates also a
limitation in his treatment of the moral imperative, which
he himself is aware of« •^'or •^'illich this limitation is
due to our existential estranged state ; but so also
is the moral imperative itself® (2)
He points to anibther limitation of the moral imperative
as he has outlined it in saying that it is the form alone
(1). Systematic Theology III, p 169.
(2). The relationship between morality (moral imperative) and
the existence of God will be treated in a later chapter.
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that is unconditionala The content of the moral imperative
is distinct from the form and ^ is not unconditional ar
absolutely commanded. (l). Because the ethical content
is the product it shares all the relativity of cultural creat
ivity. In maintaining that the form alone of the moral
imperative is unconditional he claims he is adopting Kants
position. It is this limitation in Kants doctrine thatt
he regards as the most valuable part of the Kantian theory.
If the Kantian position is accepted the relativity of
all concrete contents of ethical propositions are accepted
and enphasised.
"The endless material of the anthropologist,
psychologmst and sociologist about the differences
of ethical ideals is then no argument against
the xmconditional validity of the moral imper
ative (l).
But this relativity of the material content of the
moral imperative or even the fact that there is a certain
risk of error involved when one is confronted with a moral
alternative does not affect the moral imperative as such.
Iftiatever the content is, or whatever the alternative
chosen, the unconditional aspect of the moral imperative
is dependent only on the pure 'ought to be',, that is on the
formal aspect of the moral imperative.
"Should anyone be in doubt as to which of
several possible acts conforms to the moral
imperative, he should be reminded that each of
them might be justified in a particular
situation but that whatever he chooses must be
done with the consciousness of standing under
an unconditional imperative (2),
It would appear that we have here a very severe limitation
to the unconditional aspect of the moral imperative.
(1). Theology and ^ulture p 135.
(2) Morality and Beyond p 25.
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If the form alsone is -uncoiiditional, we cannot^ becanae of
the relativity of all content, derive any -universal or concrete
norms from this formal principle. As we skfe.ll see later
it is because of'this that he is opposed to an ethics of
law in any form (l)«. •'^ oes it follow that the search for
universal norms in ethics is an Utopian dream as far as
Tillich is concerned? Uot exactly . %e unconditional
aspect of the moral imperative is not built on the
absoluteness of a universal norm but on an absoluteness of a
different nature. In linking the unconditional aspect
directly to the person to person encounter father than
to a -universal law or norm Tillich is opting for
an ethics of love rather than an e thics of law.
"In the person to person encounter , we have
more than an abstract knowledge of a moral
imperative. One is now in the dimension of
agape or love , which affirms the other one in an
act of reunions... Here the moral imperative and
the ethical content come together and constitute
the theononomous morality of the spiritual
community " (2).
•^s we shall see later in this article it is trying to
break through to an ethics of love rather than an ethics
of law, centred on the person to person encounter , that
Tillich hopes to safeguard an absolute element not only in
the form of the moral imperative but in the content also
— and that despite what he says about the rselativity of all
ethical contents® To be more accurate, however, it is
in going beyond these distinctions between form and content
between absolute and relative elements that he hopes to
escape the liMtation^i of the moral imperative outlined
above. He thinks h$s concept of agape enables him to do this. (3!
(1) Tillich's stand on the relativity of contents of the
moral imperative must be seen in the light of his
metaphysics especially that of the polarity of form and
dynamics. His position is not as extreme as at first appears.(2). Chapter V. will be devoted to this concept, of agape.
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Tillicii's position in regard to the relativity of all
ethical contents will appear less extreme in the light of
a distinction "between an absolute absolute and a relative
absolute^that Lerlercq makes. (l). One h^s a moral
imperative that is absolutely absolute when it corresponds
to specific exigencies of the human species. It is
absolutely demanded on all occasionsOne has a moral
imperative that is relatively absolute when it
corresponds to the individual nature in certain particular
circumstances. It is absolute from the personal point of
view in that I am unconditionally bo\md to realise my
perfection, ^^illich denies the existence of the former ,
the absolutely absolute and to understand ^illich's
position here wie must get rid of all presuppositions
about an unchangable natural law or a universal human nature
typical of Thomist ethical philosophy and see Tillichs
position in the light of hi^wn anthropological and
metaphysical presuppositions. (2). Tillich, to my mind
does not deny the existence of a moral imperative that
is relatively absolute, in form or in content® He does not
of course 51se this terminology®
AMBIGUITIES.
After what was sai§ about the ambiguities of all life
processes in the previous chapter it is not surprising
that they penetrate also %iie to the spiritual dimension
in man where the moral imperative is situated. Because of
the overall framework of his philosophy.^ ambiguities are
(1).LECLERGQ: Les Grandes Lignes de la Philosophie Morale
pp 399-400.
(2) It is his doctrine of the ICairos that excludes law as the
foimdation of Ethics as we shall see in the next chapter.
100.
bound to appear in the person to person encounter as
source of the moral imperative.
As in every other form of self-integration the
personal centre moves "between the two poles of self^identity
and self-alteration, in constituting the moral dimension.
Both movements are always effective in actual life
processes under the conditions of existential self-estrangement.
Personal life is ambiguously pulled between forces of essential
cen^redness and existential self-estrangement or disruption.
Faced with innumerable possibilities of action, I try to
increase the content of my centred unity, by accepting some
of them, though seeking to maintian this unity at the same
time, '^'here is always the possibility of imbalance or disrupt
ion, '^ 'o keep a balance between the amount of encountered
and accepted reality — quantitavely and qualitively — one
accepts or rejects in the centred self involves sacrifice and
risk at every stage of the procedure» Both imply the
possibility of ambiguity — ambiguity that cannot be avoided.
"The risk must be taken in full awareness that it is
a risk and not something tinambiguously good
or categorically commanded" (l)
It is the relativity of all ethical contents that is
responsible for this element of risk in all ethical decisions
It is inherent in the moral imperative itself,
a consequence of the conflicts ambiguities and contradictions
involved in personal self-integration, j^hese ambiguites
are part of the moral imperative itself because the latter
is itself a feature of our estranged state.
We have an instance of the ambiguity of the moral
imperative in that it does not provide a criteria of what
(l) systematic Theology III. p 46
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kind of person to person enco-unter leads to the experience
of the moral imperatives Iflao or ^i^hat can be regarded as
a person ? One could feply,Tiiiich suggests, by saying
that every human being is a person meaning by that
beings who according to their psychological structure are
potential persons. One includes there all the degrees of
actualization of human personality. i\ccording to
Tillich \mcertainty and ambiguity will still remain, ^'here
are innumerable non-personal encounters which might satisfy
this definition but which would not lead to the apprehension
of the moral imperative. When walking with other people
in a crowd or when reading a newspaper one is encountering
other people (l). These are potentially personal
encounters but they never become actual« Hence it
follows that
"The transition from the potentially personal
encounter to the actual one: is a field with
countless ambiguities, many of which put before us painful
decisions" (2)
This uncertainty in respect to beings who are
encoimtered as persons indicates, according to Tillich, that
one cannot escape the relativity of ethical principles
even by pointing our the vinconditional element in the moral
imperative, - '^he latter is purely formal in •^illich's eyes. (3)
To maintain the existence of an unconditional moral imperative
does not ensure the existence of an unchanging ethical
content.
"In the very moment the principle must be applied,
traditions, conventions, and authuzjities on the
one hand ( all implying relativity for TiHich )
and personal risk on the other determine the
ethical demand (3).
(1). Systematic Theology III. p 46.
(2). Morality and Bey/)nd p 36.
(3). Morality and Beyond p 37.
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The basic reason for all this amlsiguity is oiur
estranged existential situation. It is in fact a mixture of
essential and existential elements. Hence the possibility
of separating all our ethical decisions into those
which are absolutely good and those which are absolutely
evil, or even into good and evil in an unambiguous way
is impossible. In the.person to person encounter then
we do experffiffince a moral imperative. It is unconditional
in its form alone. It does not enable us to escape the
ambiguities of our estranged state.
Again the question arises is the search for an unambiguous
moral content incapable of fulfillment ? It would
appear so if one restricts oneself to a morality of the
categorical imperative. Tillich however has no intention of
doing this. In analysing the person to person encounter
one stage further, one does not so much get rid of
i BS
the ambiguity of ethical contents as bypass them.
•'^ ven in our estranged state there is still the
possibility that mans essential nature can manaffest itself
in an unambiguous way — not in the form of a moral
imperative or as a command but as agape. One goes beyond
the abstract notion of acknowledging the other person as
a person, which is all we have reached so far in our
analysis of the person to person encounter.
"This encounter becomes concrete only in the notion
of participating in the other person" (l).
Without participation one would not know what the other self
means or be able to make the distinction between a
'person to person encounter'and a person - object encounter.
(I).
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What characterises the participation in the other person
that leads to this insight ? It cannot "be a participation
in the particular characteristics of another self with
our own particular characteristics«> "l^his would be the
more or less successful convergence of two particularities
which could lead to sympathy or friendship. Hojrsv-er
According to Tillich this would only be a matter of chance
and this kind of participation would not constitute a moral
imperative®
"The moral imperative demands that one self
participate in the centre of the other self,
and consequently accepts his particular
characteristics even if there is no convergence
between the two individuals as individuals, ^he
acceptance of the other self by participating in
his personal centre is the core of love in the
sense of agape" (l) .
For ^illich then real encounter with another person
cannot be performed with legal detachment or cool
objectivity, "jtiere is an element of invol-\|nent
and! mutual sharing in every genuine personal encounter.
It is thus by extending his analysis of the person
to person encounter that '^illich ensures that his
moral philosophy will not be merely an ethics of moral
imperatives ( or of law as we shall see in the next
chapter!* He: goes beyond this so that his ethics
will be primerally an ethics of love or of agape (2), To
the preliminary formal answer that the unconditional
character of the moral imperative is experienced in the
person to person encounter he now adds that
(1) Systematic Theology III, p 48,
(2) Morality and Beyond p 36.
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"it is in agape that concreteness is given to the
moral imperative, centredness to the person and
foundation to the life of the spirit" (l).
•^gape goes beyond all distinction of formal and material
/AT
elements g(t the moral imperative® It goes beyond the
question of absolute and relative elements . Or to be
more accuraj^te it fuses all these elements together,
'• '^he limitations and ambiguities of the moral imperative
cannot be avoided because they are part of the moral
imperative® Nevertheless they can be circumvented if one
takes this concept of agape as having a central role to play
in moral philosophy.
To the objection that agape too can lead to ambiguity,
or to ambiguous decisions, which are also lacking in uncondit
ional v-alidity from the point of view of ethical content,
^illich replies that ambiguity is unavoidable. The
alternative is radical ethical formalism and he points out
that iihis is a logical impossibility that not even Eant
could consistently maintain. The form always keeps traces
of that from which it has been abstracted.
f- To my mind Tillich takes an intermediate position
between the formalism of Kantian ethics and the relative
ethics of pragmatic philosophers. By finding at the
root of the moral imperative the notion of agape, he claims
to find there 'the radicalism of the pure form united
with the relativity of the pure content
"In agape the moral imperative and the ethical
content come together and constitute a
theononomous morals" (2).
It is here finally that all ambiguities and all limitations
are transcended.
(1). Sustematic Theology III p 48.
(2),
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CONCLUSION
At first sight this may appear to "be an artifioal solution
to the question of the limitations and ambiguities of the
moral imperative. Have we here nothing more than a mere
iuKl^positioning of conditional and unconditional elements.^
of absolute and relative elements in this concept of agape.
I'he answer to this question must "be left aside until
we examine in^lail , not only his concept of agape to
which he devotes a good deal of attention in his works,
but also the relationship of this concept to the moral
imperative , to law and to other ethical concepts with
which it forms a unified whole® ds we shall see^the original
element in Tillichs ethical philosophy consists not only
in the personal way he analyses such basic concepts as law,
agape, or the moral imperative but also, and even more so,
the way he relates these concepts to one another to form
a balanced whole. We need not only a knowledge of his ,
A 'cf
treatment of these concepts individually but alsO/\tne
intricate way they are united to form a consistent moral
philosophy — consistent not only in itself , but also
consistent with the rest of his phiiiosophical thought^
As to the validity of this ethical philosophy
that will be one of our future tasks to determine.
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